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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates the relationship between investment and environmental 
obligations from the perspective of international investment law. In order to do so, the 
dissertation will consider how these obligations might enter into conflicts and what 
tools are available to investment tribunals to solve these normative conflicts. The 
dissertation analyses in order interpretative techniques, conflict resolution tools 
available in general international law, as expressed in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, and finally express clauses in international investment agreements. The 
dissertation includes the review of some relevant case law arising from investment 
agreements in investment treaty tribunals, to discover how in practice these conflict 
resolution tools are applied and to assess their effectiveness. This dissertation places 
itself squarely within the debate between the unity and the fragmentation of 
international law; therefore it tackles the issue of normative conflicts resolution in a 
dispute settlement environment with the view of gauging their value in maintaining the 
unity of international law and defuse the risk of fragmentation. The dissertation can 
only conclude that much work remains to be done, including by providing a more 
comprehensive taxonomy of possible interventions, both on the legal and political 
sphere.  
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1. Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction and Scope 
 
In the last fifty years international law has undergone a process of differentiation into 
separate functional regimes, such as trade law, human rights law, investment law, 
environmental law and so on. The most developed amongst these regimes are 
characterised by three features: first, the systematisation of their legal rules through 
multilateral treaties (for example the WTO Agreements or the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS) or a network of bilateral treaties (for 
example, International Investment Agreements or IIAs); second, treaty bodies or some 
other form of international institutional presence
1
 (for example, the various human 
rights bodies within the United Nations, or the World Bank’s International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes); and, third, a form of enforceable dispute 
settlement system (for example, the WTO’s Panels and Appellate Body, or the system 
of regional human rights courts, or finally, investment tribunals). This process of 
differentation and fragmentation has engendered a sustained debate, mostly focussing 
on the possible negative influence on the coherence and very survival of the ‘idea of 
international law’.2  
 
One of the outcomes of this differentiation is the potential for conflicts to arise between 
obligations entered into by States in different areas of international law; one of the most 
controversial and widely known and analysed is the potential for conflicts between trade 
law and other areas such as environmental and human rights law, but this is by no 
means neither the only nor the most egregious example.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Institutionalisation, certainly the most momentous of developments from the point of view of its 
consequences, happens on a scale: at the one hand, one can think of examples of accomplished 
institutionalisation and constitutionalisation such as the European Union; on the other, more inchoate 
attempts, where an institutional presence coexists with the traditional bilateralism of international 
law, as is the case for international investment law. The coexistence of contrasting paradigms in this 
field has been noted before in the investment literature; it would be wrong to dismiss one paradigm 
on the basis of the other.  
2
 The highest level outcome of these debates can certainly be said to be the report of the International Law 
Commission (ILC), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN4/L682, 13 April 2006, 27. Since then, a 
more integrationist view has come to the fore, which is in itself indicative of the relevance of the 
phenomenon; see for example Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), Farewell to Fragmentation – 
Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (CUP 2015). 
3
 It is not a coincidence that one of the most influential recent studies on normative conflicts in 
8 
 
This dissertation considers the issue of conflicts in their ‘pure’ form, in that it does not 
engage with conflict resolution tools out-with those traditionally allowed in 
international law, ie the customary rules as recognised in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT)
4
 (Chapter 3) and savings clauses in IIAs (Chapter 4); 
specifically, the dissertation will not consider the use of proportionality analysis to 
decide conflicts of rights in a judicial context. This is partially a choice dictated by the 
length limitations of this work, and partially because I believe it is better to suspend 
judgment on these normative speculations on the work that tribunals ‘ought to’ perform 
and rather focus on the work that tribunals ‘do’ perform within the legal framework 
they find themselves in, as proportionality analysis is still used sparingly by arbitration 
tribunals.
5
 This of course is without prejudice, for example, to the status of 
proportionality as a customary international law standard of review and as such, 
applicable to the work of tribunals as directed by the applicable law clauses in the 
relevant instrument.  
 
1.2 International Investment Treaties – A Periodisation 
 
International treaties dedicated exclusively or partially to the regulation of international 
investment are a relatively new phenomenon with significant historical precedents.
6
 For 
the purpose of this work, there will be considered those treaties signed between 1959 
and the present day. It was in that year that Germany signed its first bilateral investment 
treaty with Pakistan, and this is considered the first modern investment treaty.
7
  
 
                                                                                                                                               
international law is firmly located in the field of international trade law, and in the context of the 
resolution of conflicts between trade and environmental obligations; see Joost Pauwelyn, Conflicts of 
Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law 
(CUP 2009). 
4
 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. 
5
 The most recent arbitral pronouncement on the issue by the Al Tamimi Tribunal, which refrained from 
taking a position because it considered the actions indicated by the Complainant not attributable to 
the State or as having taken place after the investment had ceased to exist; see Adel A Hamadi Al 
Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No ARB/11/33, Award (3 November 2015) paras 391 ff.  
6
 On the early developments of international investment law, see Edwin Borchard, The Diplomatic 
Protection of Citizens Abroad (Banks Law Publishing 1915); a recent review that takes into account 
the hybrid origins of the regime in Joost Pauwelyn, ‘At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law 
as a Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed’, (2014) 29 ICSID 
Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 372.  
7
 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes), Germany 
and Pakistan, 25 November 1959, 457 UNTS 24 (entered into force 28 November 1962).  
9 
 
In this work, reference will be made to a chronological periodisation in four phases: the 
first one from 1959 to 1992; the second one, from 1992 to 2004; the third one, from 
2004 to the early 2010s; the fourth period is now in its infancy and for the purpose of 
this periodisation, it is still difficult to say what will be its defining characteristics. Any 
such categorisation risks simplifying too much what is a complex area of law; the 
intention of this exercise is to bring to the fore certain elements of the investment 
instruments (inevitably to the detriment of other, equally important, characteristics) 
connected to contemporary developments in environmental protection law. This in itself 
can point to longer term trends in the parallel developments of these disciplines: how do 
they interact? Is there a pattern of systemic closure or mutual  learning, or one-way 
influence? Arguably all these questions require a more nuanced answer than this rough 
categorisation is capable of offering; however, its role here is strictly utilitarian, rather 
than the springboard to more in-depth analysis, and as such is included in this work. The 
focus on developments in the US context is organic to the specific interaction of 
investment and environmental rules in North America, especially following the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the investment arbitrations arising under 
its Chapter Eleven.
8
 
 
The first period covers the first generation bilateral investment treaties (BITs), mostly 
ratified between European and developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America. 
They are ‘pure’ investment treaties, more political tools than legally binding agreements 
(at least in the intentions of the drafters) with few, general, substantive provisions and, 
from the late 1960s onwards, mixed arbitration clauses, with or without direct reference 
to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
Convention.
9
 Almost none of them contains any language expressly relating to 
environmental obligations of the State host of the investment, particularly other 
international environmental obligations. This first generation of treaties is characterised 
by a focus on investment protection, and has generally been considered as an example 
of the orthodox approach to investment protection, seen in isolation from its 
international law framework. But the eminently political nature of this generation of 
                                                 
8
 North American Free Trade Agreement, US-Canada-Mexico, 17 December 1992, 32 
ILM 289 (1993). 
9
 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 575 UNTS 159. 
10 
 
treaties should not be forgotten;
10
 to the extent that their forensic interpretation by 
tribunals adopts an isolationist approach, that in itself can be construed as a politically 
motivated interpretation ex post of these treaties. No independent investment regime 
existed at the time the treaties were first concluded. Nonetheless, it remains the case that 
a prima facie claim that first generation treaties do not explicitly incorporate 
environmental, or other non-investment, obligations remains true.  
 
The second period starts from 1992, the year in which Canada, the United States and 
Mexico signed the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);
11
 this period is 
characterised by a series of phenomena including the exponential growth of BITs; the 
consolidation into the field of investment treaties of the United States, both with BITs 
and with the regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with an investment chapter, which 
will be the model for further developments; and the beginnings of the investment 
arbitration explosion which will define the next phase, with the consolidation of the 
ISDS system.
12
 The second generation of treaties is characterised by the consistent 
inclusion of the dispute settlement clause; additionally, at the tail-end of the period, the 
treaties signed by the United States started including a reference to labour and 
environmental obligations in their preambles. It is the combination of the powerful 
dispute settlement tool and the relative ambiguity and openness of the language of the 
treaties to have created the conditions for the interpretative leeway taken by some 
tribunals in delivering their awards. From the perspective of this study, in this period we 
also see the first treaties that include non-investment, including especially 
environmental, obligations in the body of the treaty. 
 
The third period starts with the modification, made by the United States and Canada in 
2004, of their model BITs in the direction of a clarification of the language and 
limitations of the scope of some protections. This, as the other dates chosen, is a 
somewhat artificial distinction, belieing some longer term trends. Just as the NAFTA 
heralded a ‘bull’ period for the investment treaty fortunes, the modified BITs by the 
                                                 
10
 See for example Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of 
International Investment Law’, in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E Viñuales, The 
Foundations of International Investment Law (OUP 2014) 11, 23 ff. 
11
 NAFTA (n 8).  
12
 The first treaty investment arbitration award was issued in 1990, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v 
Democratic Socialist Republic of  Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Award 27 June 1990 (1991) 
6 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 526. 
11 
 
United States and Canada are symptomatic of the ‘backlash’ in the fortunes of the BITs 
and the start of a ‘bear’ period for their market.13 The period is also characterised by the 
downward trend in the ratification and conclusion of new BITs, now more often 
referred to as ‘international investment agreements (IIAs) contextually to the growth of 
regional and bilateral FTAs, especially in Asia, and the development of what could be 
called FTAs plus, that is, agreements containing investment chapters and side 
agreements, or chapters, on environmental, labour and human rights obligations, more 
explicitly pegged to other international treaties. Once again, the United States can be 
seen as the catalyst for change, as at the beginning of the second period. This is 
particularly the case with regards to the inclusion of provisions beyond the regulation of 
trade and investment, as a consequence of the adoption by the US Congress of the 2002 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act.
14
 This Act, which expired in 2007, gave the 
President the authority to negotiate trade agreements contextually dictating a series of 
‘trade negotiating objectives’ to include ‘to ensure that trade and environmental policies 
are mutually supportive and enhance the international means of doing so’, ‘to promote 
respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with core labor standards 
of the ILO’ and ‘to strive to ensure that [trade] agreements do not weaken or reduce the 
protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for 
trade’.15  
 
The fourth, current period, is developing along a further hybridisation of clauses (for 
our purpose, the presence of environmental clauses), a regionalisation and 
multilateralisation of agreements and possibly dramatic developments in the dispute 
settlement facilities, including the proposal for an investment court at EU level
16
 and, 
                                                 
13
 The trend is continuing, according to the UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2013 (United Nations 
2013), 101; according to the Report, 2012 saw the lowest number of new BITs being signed in a 
single years since the late 1980s. The more recent 2015 Report also attests to a trend towards reform, 
with almost 50 countries and regions undergoing a process of reform of their current IIAs; see 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015 (United Nations 2015) xi and 106 ff. Finally, amongst the 
high-level ‘exits’, Italy announced in January 2015 its intention to withdraw from the Energy Charter 
Treaty with effect on January 2016; see ‘Italy Withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty’, Global 
Arbitration News, 6 May 2015, http://globalarbitrationnews.com/italy-withdraws-from-energy-
charter-treaty-20150507/ accessed 17 December 2015.  
14
 19 USC § 3801 (2006). 
15
 Sec 2102 (Trade Negotiating Objectives) of the Act. 
16
 See ‘Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and investment 
negotiations’ European Commission Press Release, 16 September 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5651_en.htm; ‘EU finalises proposal for investment protection and Court System for 
TTIP’, European Commission Press Release, 12 November 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6059_en.htm accessed 17 December 2015. A permanent investment tribunal and 
12 
 
less dramatically, the increased occurrence of disputes where investors challenge not 
environmental measures, but the withdrawal of environmental subsidies,
17
 in a re-
balancing of the role of the ‘environmental other’ in the investment regime.18 
 
The periodisation followed in this dissertation (minus the fourth phase) has been 
proposed before;
19
 the novel element is taking the development of the non-investment 
aspects, and specifically, the environmental element, as the defining marker for the 
differentiation between the stages. It is noteworthy that even when taking different 
markers into account, a similar periodisation emerges, pointing to similar trends within 
the investment regime, regardless of the indicator into consideration (for example, the 
relationship between the investment and the human rights, or labour law, regime).  
 
1.3 Normative Conflicts in the Investment Regime 
 
Normative conflicts in international law can arise whenever there is a conflict between 
international obligations or between domestic and international obligations; the focus of 
this dissertation is on the way in which investment law accommodates environmental 
law and the possible conflicts between these areas of law. However, the reference to 
normative conflicts is to be intended to cover at least three different dimensions: at the 
highest level of generalisation, the tension between the demands of investment and of 
environmental protection; at the medium level, the specifically legal interaction between 
the investment and environmental law regimes; at the lowest level, the more restricted 
field of conflict rules, both as expressed in the VCLT and reflective of customary law 
and as contained in specific clauses in IIAs. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
appellate investment tribunal, and the commitment to the establishment of a permanent investment 
court have been included in the latest version of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between the EU and Canada; see the Press Release of 29 February 2016 by the EU 
Commission, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm accessed 24 May 2016. Similar 
provisions are included in the EU-Vietnam FTA; see Press Release by the EU Commission of 1 
February 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1449 accessed 24 May 2016. 
17
 See Alessandra Asteriti, ‘Climate Change Policies and Foreign Investment: Some Salient Legal Issues’ 
in Yulia Levashova, Tineke Lambooy and Ige Dekker (eds), Bridging the Gap between International 
Investment Law and the Environment (Eleven Legal Publishing 2015) 145. 
18
 See for example, Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski, Shifting Paradigms in International 
Investment Law – More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified (OUP forthcoming 2016). 
19
 See for example Pauwelyn (n 3) 11; Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The 
Way Forward’ (2011) 18 South-western Journal of International Law 307.  
13 
 
Areas of public policy such as those pertaining to the protection of foreign investment 
and the development of environmental measures have undergone a process of 
juridification at the international level,
20
 whereby they are subject more and more to 
legal regulation by means of bilateral, regional and multilateral instruments. This legal 
growth has engendered the already mentioned differentiation – ie, the evolution of 
discrete sectoral regimes of law dealing with areas of public policy (trade, investment, 
environment, etc) in an autonomous way – which manifests itself, in the investment 
regime, as a problem of conflict resolution contextual to investment disputes.   
 
Paradoxically, while international law has undergone a considerable growth, this has not 
been accompanied by an equally developing system of rules for dealing with the 
potential conflicts and by the work of international courts and tribunals applying 
conflict rules to the disputes. On the contrary, it has been noted that ‘There is relatively 
little – in fact, until recently, astonishingly little – judicial or arbitral practice on 
normative conflicts.’21 In other words, the juridification of several areas traditionally 
associated with international relations and diplomacy or with national policy-making 
has not been accompanied by a systematic approach to the resolution of the potential 
normative conflicts, which are still left to be solved politically or diplomatically by 
inter-State negotiations. In this respect, the investment dispute settlement system 
provides its own solution, as investors are free to initiate a dispute out-with the control 
of their home State; political attempts to achieve convergence in an extra-judicial 
framework, for example through treaty amendments, are potentially in tension with the 
the dispute settlement system of investment law, where private investors are conferred  
international standing to vindicate treaty rights.While the investor-State dispute 
settlement (ISDS) system offers the opportunity to tribunals to provide a judicial 
resolution to normative conflicts, the political significance of the conflicts often results 
either in an unwillingness to engage creatively with the conflict or in a default closure 
towards non-investment issues justified in jurisdictional terms.
22
  
 
                                                 
20
 For juridification as a process, see Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (2 voll, 
Beacon Press 1987) vol II 359. 
21
 ILC (n 2) 27. 
22
 The distinction between contractual breaches and treaty breaches, commonly adopted by investment 
tribunals, serves to maintain this separation, as can the applicable law clauses often contained in 
IIAs.  
14 
 
The limited judicial practice can be partially explained by the strong presumption 
against conflicts that underpins international law,
23
 according to which  States enter into 
legal obligations without wilfully contradicting or deviating from previous 
obligations.
24
 The practical consequences of this presumption rest with the conditional 
obligation imposed upon international courts and tribunals to interpret as far as possible 
the law applicable to a dispute so as not to engender a normative conflict. If more than 
one interpretation of a norm is warranted,
25
 courts are directed to that interpretation that 
is consistent with the other, potentially conflicting norm and therefore helps to maintain 
the overall coherence of the system.
26
 In the Rights of Passage Case, the ICJ stated the 
following: ‘[…] it is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a Government 
must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and intended to produce effects in 
accordance with existing law and not in violation of it.’27 The limits of the obligation 
rest squarely at the attempt to interpret, and there is not in international law a duty of 
harmonious interpretation.
28
 The presumption against conflict can be reinforced by 
                                                 
23
 ILC (n 2) 25. 
24
 See the Arbitration Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand/Japan) 
Award (4 August 2000) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2004) XXIII UNRIAA 23, para 
38(c).Unless of course the new obligation is undertaken in express and conscious contradiction to a 
previous rule, either treaty based, or as form of lex specialis with respect to general international 
law; see Pauwelyn (n 3) 207. 
25
 The proposition that more than one interpretation of a treaty is warranted is in itself contested. See for 
the assumption that treaties can have only one ‘authentic meaning’, HICEE BV v Slovakia, PCA 
Case No 2009-11, Partial Award (23 May 2011) para 139; against it, the wording of Article 17(6) of 
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement); the language of the Article was adopted at the request of the 
United States, in order to direct WTO panels to adopt the most deferential standard of review (the 
‘rational basis’ in US constitutional parlance) to the practice of WTO parties and is therefore 
ultimately derived from the judicial review approach to interpretation. See also Donald McRae, 
‘Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body: The Conundrum of Article 17(6) of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
Convention (OUP 2011) 164. How much this should also be the standard adopted in investment law 
cannot escape from the analogy between the investment regime itself and internationalised forms of 
judicial review, which has been advocated from several quarters. See for example Stephan Schill 
(ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010); Anthea Roberts, ‘The 
Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) 16 ICCA 
Congress Series 170. 
26
 Article 32(b) of the VCLT allows recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, whenever the 
interpretation in accordance to Article 31 ‘leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable’. If the presumption against normative conflict is a principle applicable to the general 
rule of interpretation, it is reasonable to assume that any potential normative conflict should direct 
the court or tribunal to have recourse to Article 32’s supplementary means of interpretation in order 
to avoid an unreasonable result. It is noteworthy that this Article is seldom mentioned, let alone 
applied, by investment tribunals.  
27
 Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections) (Portugal v 
India), ICJ Reports 1957, 142. The locus classicus for this principle is Murray v Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 US 64, 118 (1804) 6. 
28
 Electrabel SA v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability (30 November 2012) para 4.173. A domestic example of the limits of 
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conflict-minimising measures. Treaties might contain express conflict clauses regulating 
the normative relationship between successive treaties or the intra-treaty consistency of 
norms.
29
 Umbrella clauses in investment treaties can function as a sort of conflict norm, 
by establishing the binding force of the contractual obligations of the host State as a 
matter of international law, even if their role might be more correctly identified as 
creating a conflict of international obligations, by elevating the contractual obligation 
(which would have perished in its encounter with the treaty obligation) to the status of 
international law.
30
 Where the treaty does not contain any express provisions, conflicts 
are dealt with through the applicable rules in the VCLT
31
 and supplementary means of 
interpretation and conflict resolution derived from domestic and comparative law.
32
 
 
In the periodisation offered above, the incorporation of environmental law within the 
body of investment treaties is often accompanied by the addition of conflict resolution 
clauses in different forms and of varying effect. To this extent, this field of law 
exhibites a certain level of awareness of the potential distruptive nature of normative 
conflicts for the functioning of the regime, and especially its dispute settlement system. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of these clauses is often the direct result of some 
‘landmark’ tribunal awards where environmental and investment obligations were the 
subject matter of the dispute. I have already remarked that environmental law has been a 
                                                                                                                                               
interpretation is Section 3(1) of the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 ch 42 ‘So far as it is 
possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights.’ [emphasis added] 
29
 For examples of these clauses in IIAs, see Chapter 4. 
30
 On umbrella clauses in investment treaties, see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law 
(Kluwer Law International 1999) 154; James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment 
Arbitration,’ The 22nd Freshfields Lecture on International Arbitration, London, 29 November 2007; 
Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements,’ Paper 
presented at the APEC – UNCTAD Regional Seminar on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Mexico 
City, 9-10 October 2006 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2006/3).  
Umbrella clauses are becoming less popular, and only one of the IIAs reviewed in the 2015 
UNCTAD Report contains one: see UNCTAD (n 14) [2015] 112. 
31
 Article 27 VCLT regulates conflicts between treaty and domestic law; Article 30 VCLT uses 
temporality as the governing rule on the applicability of successive treaties having the same subject 
matter; Articles 53 and 64 VCLT determine the hierarchy between treaties and peremptory norms; 
Article 59 VCLT regulates the implied termination of a treaty following the conclusion of another 
treaty on the same subject matter.  
32
 The importance of supplementary means of interpretation has been played down in the VCLT, which 
does not mention them explicitly (except for Article 32), however their practical importance in 
investment arbitrations has been stressed; see for example Thomas Wälde, ‘Interpreting Investment 
Treaties: Experiences and Examples’ in Christina Binder and others, International Investment Law 
for the 21
st
 Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP 2009) 724, 733. A misuse of the 
preparatory work in Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/26, Award (2 August 2006) paras 192 ff, especially 200. 
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driver for change in investment treaties; yet another manifestation of its effect is the 
inclusion of conflict clauses in investment treaties as a preventive measure to manage 
and solve normative conflicts at the different stages of development of the law.  
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2. Chapter 2: Interpretation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Treaty interpretation is undertaken by many different actors, at many levels.
33
 It is in the 
first instance an activity undertaken by States in their role as masters of the treaty. So it 
is the Contracting Parties themselves that act as treaty interpreters in their executive, 
legislative and judicial practice. This performative interpretation – ie, the interpretation 
by States intrinsic to the performance of the treaty – is other than the forensic 
interpretation by courts and tribunals in the course of disputes arising under that treaty. 
States also participate in forensic interpretation to the extent that they are parties not 
only to the treaties, but also to the judicial or arbitral proceedings that might arise from 
those treaties.
34
 States’ submissions are part of State practice,35 contributing to the 
development of general international law, as one of the elements of customary law 
formation, and aid the process of interpretation within the meaning attributed to practice 
by Article 31(3)(b);
36
 however, to the extent that they are unilateral, as they are bound 
to be in an ISDS context, they cannot, on their own, constitute examples of authoritative 
interpretations.  
 
2.2 Interpretation in Investment Law 
 
In the case of investment tribunals, the forensic interpretation is geared towards the 
resolution of a particular dispute regarding a specified set of parties and is not binding 
on future tribunals confronted with different parties and acting, most likely, under a 
different instrument. Nonetheless, and without prejudice to the limitations imposed by 
Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, the harmonious development of international investment law is 
said to benefit from due attention being paid to the role of tribunals in the development 
of a jurisprudence constante which can be relied upon by the parties (both to the treaties 
and to the dispute) to guide their behaviour, and where therefore the forensic 
interpretation is informed not only by the language of the applicable treaty, but also by 
                                                 
33
 See most recently Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in 
International Law (OUP 2015), especially Chapters 2 and 7. 
34
 On the double role of States in this regards, see for example the Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin 
Berman in Empresas Lucchetti SA and Lucchetti Peru SA v Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/4, Annulment Decision (5 September 2007) paras 9 ff.  
35
 Wälde argues that arguments submitted in litigation are evidence of State practice unless contradicted 
by State’s behaviour outside the litigation context; see Wälde (n 32) 767. 
36
 See Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2008) 225 ff and treatment of the topic infra.  
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the interpretation of similar language provided by previous arbitral panels.
37
 As noted 
by Thomas Wälde in his Separate Opinion in the Thunderbird Award:  
 
In international and international economic law – to which investment arbitration 
properly belongs – there may not be a formal ‘stare decisis’ rule as in common law 
countries, but precedent plays an important role. Tribunals and courts may disagree and 
are at full liberty to deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can 
and should not respect well-established jurisprudence. WTO, ICJ and in particular 
investment treaty jurisprudence shows the importance to tribunals of not ‘confronting’ 
established case law by divergent opinion – except if it is possible to clearly distinguish 
and justify in-depth such divergence.
38
 
 
However, not all tribunals, and not all commentators, agree on the role and function of 
arbitral awards. For example, in the Chevron case, the Tribunal stated that 
 
It is not evident whether and if so to what extent arbitral awards are of relevance to the 
Tribunal’s task. It is in any event clear that the decisions of other tribunals are not 
binding on this Tribunal […] However, this does not preclude the Tribunal from 
considering arbitral decisions and the arguments of the Parties based upon them, to the 
extent that it may find they shed any useful light on the issues that arise […].39 
[emphasis added] 
 
Equally, in its Decision on Jurisdiction, the Quiborax Tribunal reported contrasting 
positions within the panel on the relevance of previous decisions or awards to the case:  
  
                                                 
37
 The Glamis Tribunal put it clearly at the outset of its Award: ‘A case-specific mandate is not license to 
ignore systemic implications. To the contrary, it arguably makes it all the more important that each 
tribunal renders its case-specific decision with sensitivity to the position of future tribunals and an 
awareness of other systemic implications’; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (8 June 2009) para 6. The different approaches can also be subsumed 
under the bilateral v multilateral (and multilateralising) paradigms of the investment regime; see 
Stephan Schill, ‘Ordering Paradigms in International Investment Law: Bilateralism – Multilateralism 
– Multilateralization’ in Douglas and others (n 10) 109, 131 ff. See also in general Stephan Schill, 
The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2009); the contrary position is 
consistent with a commercial approach to arbitration. See also Thomas Schultz, ‘Against 
Consistency in Investment Arbitration’ in Douglas and others (n 10) 297. 
38
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corp v United Mexican States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (26 
January 2006) Separate Opinion, para 129. 
39
 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v The Republic of Ecuador (Chevron I), PCA 
Case No 34877, Partial Award on the Merits (30 March 2010) paras 163-64. This long standing 
dispute between Chevron and Ecuador resulted in two international arbitrations, and several 
domestic proceedings in the US and in Ecuador.   
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The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is 
of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international 
tribunals. Specifically, it deems that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a 
duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It further deems that, 
subject to the specifics of the Treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a 
duty to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law, with a view to 
meeting the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards 
the certainty of the rule of law. Arbitrator Stern does not analyze the arbitrator’s role in 
the same manner, as she considers it her duty to decide each case on its own merits, 
independently of any apparent jurisprudential trend.
40
 [emphasis added] 
 
Sentiments similar to the dissenting opinion expressed by Arbitrator Stern are evident in 
the approach taken by the Romak Tribunal:  
 
With respect to arbitral awards, this Arbitral Tribunal considers that it is not bound to 
follow or to cite previous arbitral decisions as authority for its reasoning or conclusions. 
Even presuming that relevant principles could be distilled from prior arbitral awards 
(which has proven difficult with respect of many of the decisions cited by the Parties in 
these proceedings), they cannot be deemed to constitute the expression of a general 
consensus of the international community, and much less a formal source of 
international law. Arbitral awards remain mere sources of inspiration, comfort or 
reference to arbitrators.
41
 [emphasis added] 
 
The general rule in Article 31 VCLT provides a holistic approach to treaty interpretation 
that subsumes the three main canons, textual, subjective and teleological.
42
 As noted by 
the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal,  
 
                                                 
40
 This statement had already been made by the Tribunal in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS 
v The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29, Award (27 August 2009) para 145, 
with the difference that no disagreement with this approach had been expressed.    
41
 Romak SA v The Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL/PCA Case No AA280, Award (26 November 
2009)  para 170. See also RosInvest Co UK Ltd v Russian Federation, SCC Case No V079/2005, 
Award on Jurisdiction (October 2007) para 137; Hochtief AG v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction (24 October 2011) paras 57-8.   
42
 Article 31(1): ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose’. See for 
example Gardiner (n 36), 8 and 33 ff.  The use of the singular ‘rule’ points to the unitary character of 
the process of interpretation, rather than restricting the number of rules or principles of 
interpretation. 
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Interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is a process of progressive 
encirclement where the interpreter starts under the general rule with the (1) ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty, (2) in their context and (3) in light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose, and by cycling through this three step inquiry iteratively closes in 
upon the proper interpretation.
43
  
 
Against much contemporary discourse on the importance of Article 31(3)(c) for 
systemic integration of international legal regimes, it is imperative to restate the role of 
Article 31(1) in the interpretative work of tribunals, including the space given in it to 
the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty in its context. Two preliminary remarks seem 
apposite:
44
 first, the balancing of obligations that is at the basis of systemic integration 
is implicit in the wording of Article 31(1) already, at least on some reading of the 
inclusion of the good faith requirement in the interpreting exercise, as done by the WTO 
Appellate Body in the United States – Shrimp Report. In that dispute, that centred on the 
application of Article XX GATT, the AB clarified that it interpreted the chapeau of that 
Article as:  
 
[…] one expression of the principle of good faith [….] The task of interpreting and 
applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out 
a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under 
Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions 
[…] of the GATT 1994 […].45  
 
The AB conflated here the interpretation and application of the provisions of the GATT 
under the rubric of good faith;
46
 nonetheless, its use of this principle contextually to the 
interpretation of the scope of the chapeau to Article XX is useful to the argument that 
good faith, and the balancing of rights and obligations of States, is an intrinsic and 
                                                 
43
 Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objections to Jurisdiction (21 October 2005) para 91.  
44
 The ILC, in its Commentary on the Draft Articles on Interpretation, put it this way: ‘All the various 
elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their 
interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.’ United Nations Conference on the Law of 
Treaties: Official Records: Documents of the Conference, A/CONF39/11/Add.2 p 39 para 8. 
Leaving aside the wishful thinking flavour, the metaphor remains a powerful statement of the equal 
importance attributed by the ILC to the various elements of the interpretative work.  
45
 United States – Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO Report of Appellate 
Body AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, paras 158-159. 
46
 As noted by Gardiner (n 36) 159. 
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necessary part of the hermeneutic work of tribunals, and comes to life especially where 
the treaty explicitly allows for an exception to its obligations.  
 
Second, a restrictive interpretation confined to the close textual reading of the language 
of the treaty is not warranted nor envisaged by an ordinary reading of the terms of 
Article 3 VCLT. However, it is equally necessary to point out two considerations: first, 
the textual approach is normally practised, and often defended, by international courts 
and tribunals of all levels;
47
 second, the determination of what constitutes the ‘object 
and purpose’ of a treaty is inevitably prone to subjectivity and imprecision.48 It has been 
convincingly shown that the terms ‘object and purpose’ have to be interpreted in 
accordance with their meaning in the equally authoritative French version of the 
Convention, which adopts French public law’s distinction between object (object), 
denoting the substantive content of a treaty, and purpose (but), denoting the goal for 
which those substantive provisions are put in place; however this distinction does not 
necessarily aid the process of identification of the object and purpose for the contextual 
and teleological interpretation of the provisions of a treaty.
49
 In the last analysis, a 
careful balance between the textual and purposive interpretation, whereby, I would 
submit, the textual interpretation constitutes the ‘outer limit’ of the purposive approach. 
In other words, the textual approach has in the end function as a fetter for unbound 
purposive interpretation. Therefore, to the crucible metaphor adopted by the ILC it is 
necessary to add an element of subordination of the purposive to the textual, and within 
                                                 
47
 See already the ICJ in Competence of the General Assembly Regarding Admission to the United 
Nations: ‘[T]he first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a 
treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in 
which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their 
context, that is the end of the matter’. (Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p 4, 
8). 
48
 The Czech Republic and European Media Ventures SA, Judgment on Application to Set Aside Award 
on Jurisdiction, 2007 EWHC 2851 (Comm), paras 16-17: ‘It is clear that the proper approach to the 
interpretation of Treaty wording is to identify what the words mean in their context (the textual 
method), rather than attempting to identify what may have been the underlying purpose in the use of 
the words (the teleological method). […]The search for a common intention is likely to be both 
elusive and unnecessary. Elusive, because the contracting parties may never have had a common 
intention: only an agreement as to a form of words. Unnecessary, because the rules for the 
interpretation of international treaties focus on the words and meaning and not the intention of one or 
other contracting party, unless that intention can be derived from the object and purpose of the treaty 
[Art.31 of the Vienna Convention], its context [Art.31.1 and 31.2] or a subsequent agreement as to 
interpretation [Art.31.3(a)] or practice which establishes an agreement as to its interpretation 
[Art.31.3(b)]’. 
49
 Gardiner (n 36) 191-192. 
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the purposive approach, of the substantive content (for which again, the correctness of 
the textual hermeneutic analysis is crucial) to the ultimate goal of the treaty.  
 
Some treaties specify their object and purpose in a separate Article, normally at the very 
beginning. This is the case with the NAFTA and its Article 102 (Objectives) and the 
Energy Charter Treaty and its Article 2 (Purpose of the Treaty).
50
 More commonly 
though, the preamble of a treaty is the most common starting point for the identification 
of its object and purpose;
51
 however, recent treaties especially tend to have 
comprehensive preambles, listing numerous aims, which might well result in tensions 
and conflict when these are translated from the lofty environment of the preambular 
statement of purpose to the reality of application of substantive obligations. Conversly, 
a facile ‘translation’ of the policy-heavy, non binding language of the preamble into 
binding substantive obligations is an equally controversial exercise. For example, the 
SGS/Philippines Tribunal concluded that:  
 
The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. 
According to the preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain favourable conditions 
for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other. It is 
legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of 
covered investments.
52
 [emphasis added] 
 
 The SGS Tribunal used the language of the preamble to resolve a textual ambiguity 
within the treaty in favorem investors. As already noted, while the restrictive 
interpretation approach expressed by the Latin maxim in dubio mitius has been 
overwhelmingly rejected by international courts and tribunals,
53
 nonetheless, a more 
                                                 
50
 On the use of Article 102 NAFTA in the interpretation and application of the agreement in a Chapter 20 
(interstate) dispute, see In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain US-Origin 
Agricultural Products (Secretariat File No CDA-95-2008-01), Final Report of the Panel, 2 
December 1996, 36.   
51
 See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Preliminary Objection, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, p 803, para 27. For more examples, see Eric Suy, “Le préambule”, in 
Emile Yakpo and Tahar Boumedra (eds) Liber Amicorum Mohammed Bedjaoui (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 253.  
52 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (29 January 2004) para 116. 
53
 A recent statement of this approach by the ICJ: ‘While it is certainly true that limitations of the 
sovereignty of a State over its territory are not to be presumed, this does not mean that treaty 
provisions establishing such limitations, such as those that are in issue in the present case, should for 
this reason be interpreted a priori in a restrictive way. A treaty provision which has the purpose of 
limiting the sovereign powers of a State must be interpreted like any other provision of a treaty, i.e. 
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balanced approach than that taken by the SGS Tribunal is preferable, as expressed for 
example by the Mondev Tribunal:
54
 
 
In the Tribunal’s view, there is no principle either of extensive or restrictive 
interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in treaties. In the end the question is what the 
relevant provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the applicable rules of 
interpretation of treaties. These are set out in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which for this purpose can be taken to reflect the position under 
customary international law.  
 
A second criticism can be moved to the SGS Tribunal, to the effect that it too easily 
conflated object and purpose of the treaty and then made a logical leap between the 
stated purpose and the means necessary to accomplish it. As to the first point, the object 
of an investment agreement is the promotion and protection of investments, meaning 
that its substantive content and the rights and obligations expressed therein have to do 
with the promotion and protection of investments; it might follow that this is at least one 
of the purposes of the treaty as well, but not that, in order for this purpose to be 
furthered, any textual ambiguity has to be resolved as to favour investors, because the 
favourable treatment granted to that individual investor might non further the ultimate 
goal of the promotion and protection of investments in general. It could even be argued 
that an over-protective stance might in the long run damage the interests of the 
investors, as one might surmise from the ‘backlash’ towards investment arbitration and 
the spate of redrafting, renegotiations and renunciations of investment agreements.
55
 
 
For the purpose of the harmonisation and de-fragmentation of diverse sub-systems of 
law, which are more directly relevant to the encounter between investment and 
environmental obligations, Article 31(3)(c), directing the courts and tribunals to ‘[take] 
into account, together with the context: (c) any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’, has been singled out as having the 
                                                                                                                                               
in accordance with the intentions of its authors as reflected by the text of the treaty and the other 
relevant factors in terms of interpretation.’ Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p 213, para 48. 
54
 Mondev v United States of America, NAFTA/ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 
2002) para 43. 
55
 As recognised by the Tribunal in Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award 
(17 March 2006) para 300. 
24 
 
strongest potential to allow for cross-fertilisation and integration of norms,
56
 embodying 
a general ‘principle of systemic integration’.57 
 
Additionally, Article 31(3)(c) is tasked to deal with issues of inter-temporal law,
58
 
including the interpretation of the language of the treaty at the time of conclusion or at 
the time of application,
59
 and the relationship between the treaty being interpreted and 
general international law, where the treaty can be pegged to the CIL at the time of 
conclusion, or respond to the developments in CIL.
60
 The inter-temporal and the subject 
matter integrative components of Article 31(3)(c) are encapsulated in the language 
‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.61 By 
way of example, in approaching their interpretative work, tribunals have to consider if 
                                                 
56
 In United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (12 October 1998) 
WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998, the Appellate Body referred to Article 31(3)(c) directly, para 158 and n 
157. See ILC (n 2) 206 ff. The clause was included originally to deal with the issue of inter-temporal 
application of treaties; see Gardiner (n 36) 250 ff. For an application of the principle in a case 
involving environmental policy, see Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium/Netherlands) 2005 PCA, paras 
58 ff. 
57
 Philippe Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and Cross-Fertilization of International Law’ (1998) 1 Yale Human 
Rights and Development Law Journal 95.  
58
 For the issue in historical context, see Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v US) (1928), PCA, sole 
arbitrator, Judge Huber, 2 RIAA 829; Jan Klabbers, ‘Reluctant Grundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 
42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Fragmentation of International Law, in 
Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds), Time, History and International 
Law (Brill 2007) 141; Humphrey Waldock, ‘Third report on the law of treaties’, (1964) II Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission. 
59
 Costa Rica v Nicaragua (n 53). But already in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p 31, para 53. For a recent review of 
how the PCIJ and the ICJ have dealt with the issue of textual interpretation, see Bruno Simma and 
Theodore Kill, ’Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps 
Towards a Methodology, in Binder and others (n 32) 678, 683 ff. 
60
 Wälde (n 32) 769 ff, rightly points to the ‘Janus-faced’ character of Article 31(3)(c), allowing for a 
‘conservative’ interpretation of treaty law in the context of general international law at the time of 
the agreement, or a ‘progressive’ interpretation of treaties as ‘living instruments.’ See also Joost 
Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations 
across International Tribunals’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds) Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations (CUP 2012) 445, 452 ff. The 
relationship between treaty language and general international law is well illustrated by the 
controversy on the scope of protection under Article 1105 NAFTA, which followed the 
interpretation of the single arbitrator Lord Dervaird in Pope & Talbot v Government of Canada, 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Interim Award on Merits, Phase 2 (10 April 2001) para 111 and Pope & 
Talbot, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Interim Award on Damages (31 May 2002) paras 49 ff. 
61
 See Gardiner (n 36) 260. It is accepted that the rules of international law comprise not only general 
international law, ie custom, but treaty rules as well or, better, all sources of international law as 
listed by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The inclusion of ‘soft law’ 
remains disputed, see Iron Rhine (n 56) para 58.  On the other hand, the limitative function of the 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ – ie if the parties are to the treaty object of the 
dispute, or to the dispute itself, or to the treaty being ‘interpreted into’ the applicable treaty – is less 
clear. For a taxonomy of possible interpretations, see Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties 
and General International Law’, (2008) 57 ICLQ 279, 314 ff.  
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the meaning of ‘development’ should be intended as it was at the time of conclusion of 
the investment instrument, or if it should take into account the current use of the term as 
‘sustainable development’ therefore adopting an evolutive approach to inter-temporal 
interpretation. In turn, the status of the obligation for States to engage only in 
sustainable development will have a bearing on the onus put on the tribunal to interpret 
this meaning into the language of the investment treaty.
62
 Several recent IIAs include 
sustainable development as one of their policy goals in the preamble;
63
 however, it 
remains within the interpretative competence of the individual tribunals if, in 
considering the object and purpose of a treaty where the terminology is not explicitly 
adopted, they prefer to consider any reference to ‘development’ to include the 
‘sustainable’ obligations, adopting a progressive interpretation of the treaty text as a 
‘living instrument’.64  
 
The inter-temporal aspect of Article 31(3)(c) was comprehensively dealt with in a 
recent arbitration that included an environmental element, the Iron Rhine Award.
65
 In it, 
the Tribunal accepted that international environmental law principles (which it held to 
be part of general international law) have a role to play in ‘the interpretation of those 
treaties in which the answers to the Questions may primarily be sought.’66 More 
specifically, in discussing the application of Article 31(3)(c), the Tribunal added that:  
 
[…] international environmental law has relevance to the relations between the Parties. 
There is considerable debate as to what, within the field of environmental law, 
constitutes ‘rules’ or ‘principles’; what is ‘soft law’; and which environmental treaty 
law or principles have contributed to the development of customary international law. 
[…] Environmental law and the law on development stand not as alternatives but as 
mutually reinforcing, integral concepts, which require that where development may 
cause significant harm to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, 
                                                 
62
 Some argue that the principle of sustainable development has entered the corpus of customary 
international law; see Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2
nd
 ed, CUP 
2003) 254. 
63
 The first FTA to do so was the NAFTA; the first BIT, the 1999 Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Republic of Costa Rica and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 2238 UNTS 9818.  
64
 This was done in the Iron Rhine arbitration (n 56). 
65
 ibid. 
66
 ibid, para 60.  
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such harm. This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now become a principle of 
general international law.
67
 
 
This integrative and progressive approach brought the Tribunal to apply the relevant 
1839 Treaty between the parties taking into account that ‘economic development is to 
be reconciled with the protection of the environment, and, in so doing, new norms have 
to be taken into consideration, including when activities begun in the past are now 
expanded and upgraded.’68 
 
In the investment regime, some instruments contain specific applicable law and conflict 
provisions that direct tribunals in their interpretative work; furthermore, references to 
‘mutual supportiveness’ in the treaty text direct the tribunals to adopt an hermeneutic 
approach consistent with the integrative thrust of Article 31(3)(c). More specific 
examples of this are the ‘mutual supportiveness clauses’ contained in many new 
generation IIAs; these are still just directed to the contracting parties, imposing a (soft) 
obligation on them with regards to their policy decision-making; more explicitly 
targeted at tribunals and their interpretative work is Article 5(E) (National Treatment) of 
the IISD Model Investment Agreement for Sustainable Development:
69
 
 
For greater certainty, the concept of ‘in like circumstances’ requires an overall examination, 
on a case by-case basis, of all the circumstances of an investment, including, inter alia: 
a) its effects on third persons and the local community; 
b) its effects upon the local, regional or national environment, or the global commons;
70
 
c) the sector the investor is in; 
d) the aim of a measure of concern; 
e) the regulatory process generally applied in relation to a measure of concern; and 
f) other factors directly relating to the investment or investor in relation to the measure of 
concern. 
The examination shall not be limited to or biased toward any one factor. 
                                                 
67
 ibid, paras 58-59. 
68
 ibid, para 221. 
69
 Applicable also, mutatis mutandis as per text, to Article 6 [Most-Favoured-Nation]. Text of the Model 
Agreement available at < http://www.iisd.org/investment/capacity/model.aspx>.  
70
 This is accompanied by the following note (7 in the text): ‘The Parties understand that such 
considerations can include the cumulative impacts of all investments within a jurisdiction, for 
example in the natural resources harvesting sectors or in relation to setting of ambient or specific 
pollution loads. Many jurisdictions do not allow new investments that will cause applicable 
environmental or human health tolerances to be exceeded.’ 
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This measure is clearly directing tribunals to a ‘systemic’ interpretation of the National 
Treatment and MFN standard provisions, including not only the factual circumstances, 
but also the regulatory and legislative background of the investment.
71
  
   
2.3 Article 31(3)(c) in Investment Awards 
 
Investment tribunals often refer to the VCLT in their awards, not always as a prelude to 
a meaningful engagement with its provisions. However, it is not as often that they more 
or less explicitly utilise Article 31(3)(c) as part of their interpretative exercise. The 
following are the most representative examples. 
 
2.3.1 SD Myers v Canada 
 
In the SD Myers Case, one of the first NAFTA arbitrations, the Tribunal had to deal 
with a defence based on conflicting environmental obligations.
72
 The Tribunal, in its 
interpretative exercise did not make explicit reference to the environmental language 
contained in the treaty, and approached the relationship between environmental and 
investment obligations of the Defendant by reference to the ‘general principles that 
emerge from that context [NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement NAAEC and the 
Rio Declaration].’73 The Tribunal explicitly referred to the VCLT, but only to Article 
31(1) and its textual rule. However, when applying Article 1102 of the NAFTA 
(National Treatment), the Tribunal stated the following: 
  
The Tribunal considers that the legal context of Article 1102 includes the various 
provisions of the NAFTA, its companion agreement the NAAEC and principles that are 
affirmed by the NAAEC (including those of the Rio declaration). The principles that 
emerge from that context, to repeat, are as follows: 
                                                 
71
 An example in practice of this approach is the analysis of the MFN provision conducted by the 
Tribunal in Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, Award 
(11 September 2007) para 392, where ‘in like circumstances’ was interpreted by reference to the 
archaeological and cultural value of the area (and its UNESCO status), which rendered it ‘not 
similar’ to the comparator. See also OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: 
National Treatment of Foreign Controlled Enterprises (OECD 1985) 17.  
72
 SD Myers Inc v Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Partial Award (13 November 2000). 
73
 ibid, para 247.  
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- states have the right to establish high levels of environmental protection. They are not 
obliged to compromise their standards merely to satisfy the political or economic 
interests of other states; 
- states should avoid creating distortions to trade; 
- environmental protection and economic development can and should be mutually 
supportive.
74
 
 
And shortly thereafter it added: 
 
The Tribunal considers that the interpretation of the phrase ‘like circumstances’ in 
Article 102 must take into account the general principles that emerge from the legal 
context of the NAFTA, including both its concern with the environment and the need to 
avoid  trade distortions that are not justified by environmental concerns. The assessment 
of ‘like circumstances’ must also take into account circumstances that would justify 
governmental regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the public 
interest.
75
 
 
The Tribunal left therefore open an interpretation of Article 1102 that took into account 
the principles stated in the environmental agreements applicable in the relations 
between the parties. It is also noteworthy that the Tribunal approached the analysis on 
the breach of Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) by reference to the 
content of the international minimum standard in general international law, and also in 
concert to what it defined ‘similar provisions’ in BITs (fair and equitable treatment 
standard); the Tribunal stated the following: 
 
The Tribunal considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is shown that 
an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment 
rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective. That 
determination must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate 
matters within their own borders. The determination must also take into account any 
specific rules of international law that are applicable to the case.
76
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 ibid.  
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 ibid, para 263. 
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The controversy regarding the content of Article 1105 NAFTA is well known and does 
not bear rehearsing; on the relationship between the standard and general international 
law, the Tribunal did not clarify if pegging the treatment ‘in accordance with 
international law’ included the inter-temporal element of treaty interpretation. Several 
other tribunals have explicitly relied on a progressive interpretation of customary 
international law in applying the Article; most recently the Chemtura Tribunal declared 
that: ‘[…] the Tribunal will take account of the evolution of international customary law 
in ascertaining the content of the international minimum standard’.77  
 
2.3.2 Grand River v United States 
 
In another more recent NAFTA arbitration, the Grand River Tribunal had to deal with a 
Claimant’s request to interpret human rights obligations into the language of NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11.
78
 In its reply, and dealing with the application of Article 31(3)(c) the 
Tribunal relied on a rigid distinction between jurisdiction, applicable law and 
interpretative powers, stating that:  
 
The Tribunal understands the obligation to ‘take into account’ other rules of 
international law to require it to respect the Vienna Convention’s rules governing treaty 
interpretation. However, the Tribunal does not understand this obligation to provide a 
license to import into NAFTA legal elements from other treaties, or to allow alteration 
of an interpretation established through the normal interpretative processes of the 
Vienna Convention. This is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction; it has no mandate to 
decide claims based on treaties other than the NAFTA […] The Tribunal is particularly 
mindful in this regard of the Free Trade Commission’s directive that a violation of an 
obligation under another treaty does not give rise to a breach of Article 1105.
79
 
 
The Claimant had raised the issue of conflicting obligations (the NAFTA v Article III of 
the 1794 Jay Treaty), which concerned their application, and not simply interpretation; 
this was was disregarded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal invoked the Free Trade 
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 Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (2 August 2010) para 
122.  
78
 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd et al v United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 
Award (12 January 2011) para 63.  
79
 ibid, para 71. 
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Commission’s binding interpretation of Article 1105, 80 ignoring the issues, raised by 
the application, of the rules on interpretation. One is left to wonder what is left of the 
effet utile of Article 31(3)(c) after the very restrictive interpretation of it given by the 
Tribunal.
81
  
 
2.3.3 Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman 
 
This award, delivered by the Tribunal in November 2015, concerned a claim by a US 
investor of a breach by Oman of the US-Oman FTA’s expropriation, international 
minimum standard (IMS) and national treatment provisions in relation to the 
termination of a contract for the quarrying of limestone, and the following arrest of Mr 
Al Tamimi.
82
 The defendent State alleged in its defence serious violations of Omani 
company law and environmental law by the investor. The jurisdictional phase was 
complex and involved several challenges on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, some of 
which were successful. On the merits, the Tribunal was tasked to interpret an instrument 
containing new style expropriation and minimum standard clauses, in which the US had 
incorporated respectively the Annex to expropriation included in the 2004 Model BIT 
and the clarification on the relationship between IMS and FET resulting from the 
already mentioned Interpretative Note on Article 1105 NAFTA. The expropriation 
claim failed as the Tribunal did not accept that the events rose beyond a contractual 
dispute to be solved, in accordance to the compromissory clause in the contract, in the 
local courts.  
 
On the IMS, Article 10.5 of the US-Oman FTA includes the following language: 
 
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
covered investors. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection 
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 North American Free Trade Agreement, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, July 31, 2001. 
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 See also Jorge E Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (CUP 2012) 
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defense, was taken by the Tribunal in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and 
Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 (formerly Aguas 
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and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by 
that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.
83
 
 
The Tribunal, in assessing the actions of the government in respect to the alleged 
environmental breaches, presented by the Claimant as a breach of the treaty, took into 
consideration also Article 10.10 of the FTA: 
 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a 
manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
 
There are two levels of contextualisation the Tribunals needed to address: first, the 
relationship between the IMF standard as included in the FTA, the customary law 
standard and the independently developing higher standard in other IIAs; second, its 
relationship with other, non-investment obligations as contained within the treaty and in 
international law, considered relevant as a matter of treaty interpretation under Article 
31(3)(c). As for the first issue, the Tribunal followed the interpretation adopted already 
by the Glamis Tribunal, ie a minimalist reading of the standard in line with the Neer 
dictum.
84
  
 
On the second and, for the purpose of this study, more relevant issue, the Tribunal 
clearly adopted a reading of the IMF obligation contextual to environmental obligations 
as contained in the above-mentioned Article 10.10, in Chapter 17 of the FTA (the 
Environment Chapter) and in general international law, thereby applying, without 
explicitely referring to it, Article 31 VCLT in toto. The brief discussion of the Tribunal 
is worth reporting in full: 
 
[...] the US – Oman FTA places a high premium on environmental protection. It is 
uncontroversial that general principles of customary international law must be applied 
                                                 
83
 The language is further clarified in Annex 10-A: ‘The parties confirm their shared understanding that 
‘customary international law’ generally and as specifically referenced in Article 10.5 and Annex 10-
B results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal 
obligation. With regard to Article 10.5, the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law principles that protect economic rights 
and interests of aliens.’ 
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in the context of the express provisions of the Treaty. In the present case, Article 10.10 
expressly qualifies the construction of the other provisions of Chapter 10, including 
Article 10.5. The wording of Article 10.10 provides a forceful protection of the right of 
either State Party to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure to ensure that investment is 
‘undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns’, provided it is not 
otherwise inconsistent with the express provisions of Chapter 10. Moreover, Chapter 17 
of the US – Oman FTA entitled ‘Environment’, although it does not fall directly within 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, provides further relevant context in which the provisions of 
Chapter 10 must be interpreted. Article 17.2.1, for instance, records the Parties’ 
understanding that: 
(a) Neither Party shall fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a 
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between 
the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.  
(b) The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with 
respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make 
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other 
environmental matters determined to have higher priority. Accordingly, the Parties 
understand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action 
or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide 
decision regarding the allocation of resources. 
The very existence of Chapter 17 exemplifies the importance attached by the US and 
Oman to the enforcement of their respective environmental laws. It is clear that the 
State Parties intended to reserve a significant margin of discretion to themselves in the 
application and enforcement of their respective environmental laws – indeed, Article 
17.2.1 compels each State to ensure the effective enforcement of environmental laws. 
Article 17.2.1(b), moreover, acknowledges that environmental law enforcement is not 
inherently consistent in its application. The Tribunal in SD Myers v Canada 
acknowledged that tribunals “do not have an open-ended mandate to second-guess 
government decision-making”, and this must particularly be the case in light of the 
express terms of the present Treaty relating to environmental enforcement. When it 
comes to determining any breach of the minimum standard of treatment under Article 
10.5, the Tribunal must be guided by the forceful defence of environmental regulation 
and protection provided in the express language of the Treaty.  
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While the Tribunal is clear on its jurisdictional limitations, establishing the existence of 
a breach of Article 10.15 and nothing more, it is equally forceful in its determination to 
adopt the correct, contextual interpretative approach to the task at hand. 
 
2.4 Interim Conclusions on Interpretation 
 
In the first investment treaty award of 1990, the Tribunal included the following 
statement: 
 
It should be noted that the Bilateral Investment Treaty is not a self-contained closed 
legal system limited to provide for substantial material rules of direct applicability, but 
it has to be envisaged within a wider juridical context in which rules from other sources 
are integrated through implied incorporation methods, or by direct reference to certain 
supplementary rules, whether of international law character or of domestic law nature.
85
 
 
Contextual interpretation of the treaty is recognised as the correct approach by the 
Tribunal, and in keeping with both the language of the applicable treaty and the general 
rules of treaty interpretation. This is important because the first generation of treaties 
did not in general contain any explicit reference to other international obligations of the 
treaty parties, not because they were not relevant, but because they were implicitly 
accepted as binding upon the parties to the extent that they applied to their relationship. 
In fact, those same treaties contain numerous references to international law, 
sovereignty and domestic law. It is a consequence of the expansive interpretations by 
investment tribunals of the vague provisions of the treaties that more explicit limitations 
and clarifications have been inserted, ex abundante cautela, in order to steer the 
interpretative work of the tribunals towards a more holistic and systemic approach. 
 
The argument for a progressive and evolutionary
86
 interpretation of international law 
seems particularly apposite for regimes, such as environmental law, that are rapidly 
developing in response to changed technological and scientific knowledge and the 
demands posed on the environment by economic development and population growth. 
Its relevance in investment arbitrations will still be decided on a case-by-case basis, 
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depending on the attitude of tribunals to interpretation, the law applicable to the dispute, 
the presence or not of conventional (treaty) norms of an environmental character that 
have to be considered by the tribunal as part of its interpretative work as per Article 
31(3)(c) and the applicability of savings or conflict clauses. It is important however not 
to overstate its role, and not to view it ‘as a sort of master key enabling the systemic 
integration of otherwise disparate legal regimes’.87 Interpretation is indeed 
symbiotically dependent to conflict resolution, but this dependency should not be 
confused with inter-changeability. A tribunal tasked with interpreting an IIA together 
with the relevant (and applicable in the relation between the parties) rules of 
international law is not empowered to modify the treaty rules, but simply to have, as its 
telos, the application of the treaty rules so that the presumption of compliance is 
respected.
88
 IIAs often contain applicable law clauses directing tribunals to the 
application of international law in addition to the treaty and/or to domestic law, as 
expressed for example in Article 10(4) of the Syria – Cyprus BIT, which directs the 
tribunal to ‘settle the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, 
applied laws of the hosting country and the applicable rules and principles of 
international law’.89 To this extent, investment tribunals are under a stronger obligation, 
as far as concerns the application of other norms of international law not contained in 
the treaty than that encapsulated in Article 31(3)(c), which instructs courts merely to 
‘take [them] into account’ in their interpretative work. In other words, Article 31 
contains the rule on interpretation, not application. In consequence, investment 
tribunals are under an obligation to apply the VCLT in their interpretative work, and are 
at the same time limited by the applicable law clause of the relevant IIA, directing them 
to apply any relevant rules and principles of international law to decide the dispute. 
Therefore, non-investment rules have two potential entry points: the first, aiding the 
tribunal in its interpretative work of the IIA; and the second, remaining applicable to the 
dispute in the means accorded by the IIA or, as the case may be, by the ICSID 
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Convention or the investment contract. It bears restating the crucial nature of this 
distinction, also in light of a potential challenge to the award under Article 52(1)(a) of 
the ICSID Convention, whereby a disputing party can demand annulment of the award 
if the tribunal ‘manifestly exceeded its powers’, namely by deciding the dispute by 
applying a legal rule it was not empowered to apply (or conversely by no applying a 
legal rule it was under duty to apply) under the relevant applicable law clause in the 
treaty or the fallback rules under the ICSID Convention in case of lack of agreement 
between the parties.
90
 It is self-evident that the distinction between not applying a legal 
rule, which is a ground for annulment, and applying it incorrectly, which is not, is not 
always easily drawn and it is heavily dependent on the correct interpretation both of the 
applicable law clause, and of the substantive rule. 
 
However, arguments in support of systemic integration as the default tool in treaty 
interpretation might jar with the function of treaties as lex specialis engendering 
expectations of stability. In other words, if amongst the functions of treaties is that of 
derogating from general international law, a fortiori the more the latter departs from the 
former, the more the former should be read in its original context.
91
 An excessive 
reliance on the willingness of tribunals to approach hermeneutics with ‘systemic 
integration’ as their ultimate goal fails to account for alternative interpretative 
techniques legitimately undertaken by tribunals, less receptive to the need to harmonise 
treaty provisions beyond the jurisdictional limits of the investment regime. 
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3. Chapter 3: Conflicts in International Law 
 
3.1 An Introduction 
 
In this chapter I consider how tribunals deal with conflicts in investment arbitrations. 
The potentially problematic interaction between substantive regimes of law can be 
approached from several avenues, and in the conclusion of this chapter I provide a short 
overview of coping strategies, including a taxonomy of actions, by both States and 
tribunals, dealing with conflicts at the different stages of norm production and 
application. However, the rest of the chapter is devoted to a review of literature on 
conflicts and their conceptualisation, and specifically the tools provided by the VCLT 
for dealing with normative conflicts. The VCLT is a meta-treaty on the law of treaty 
making, and therefore it provides only a set of secondary rules, applicable universally 
whenever issues of treaty law arise, regardless of the substance of the rules involved, 
unless specifically contracted out from. It is important to remember this as investment 
treaty disputes rest squarely in the field of public international law and tribunals dealing 
with conflicts of international obligations are required to have recourse to the 
established rules of treaty interpretation and normative conflicts resolution as presented 
in Article 30 VCLT. Therefore, quite a part from the potential of substantive systemic 
integration via application of Article 31(3)(c), which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, international law integrative thrust also manifests itself in the procedural 
obligation to respect secondary rules of treaty law which applies universally. This 
without prejudice to the adoption, for example, of a certain approach to treaty 
interpretation in some regimes,
92
 which in any event, is always within the limits of what 
is allowed by the VCLT. This reminder, of the public law character of the procedural 
aspects of the investment regime, is necessary in view of the fact that the hybrid nature 
of investment law rests upon the dichotomy of the public ‘soul’ of the substantive 
provisions and the private ‘soul’ of its procedural framework.  
 
3.2 Conflicts Classification 
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 See for example the evolutionary interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights by its 
Court in Tyrer v United Kingdom, Merits, App No 5856/72, A/26, [1978] ECHR 2, (1980) 2 EHRR 
1, IHRL 17 (ECHR 1978), 25th April 1978. 
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The definition of a normative conflict is contested, as reflected in the drafting history 
and preparatory work of Article 30 VCLT.
93
 A first distinction can be made between the 
source of the obligations: there can be conflicts of international obligations, conflicts of 
domestic obligations,
94
 – which are outwith the scope of this work – and mixed conflicts 
of international and domestic obligations;  given the jurisdictional restrictions of the 
investment regime, these conflicts will normally involve a domestic environmental 
measure conflicting with an international investment rule; the space given in this 
dissertation to mixed conflicts is warranted by the recognition of domestic 
environmental obligations  – often ultimately derived by an over-arching international 
environmental committment – via the normative space granted to them in IIAs in the 
form of balancing clauses. The two main categories, pure international conflicts and 
mixed international-domestic conflicts, will be treated separately in this dissertation, as 
conflicts between international and domestic norms are regulated differently than 
conflicts between international norms. Specifically, while pure international conflicts 
are dealt with via savings clauses, mixed conflicts are more often resolved via balancing 
clauses.
95
  
 
Their differentiated treatment is also reflective of the status of international obligations 
vis-à-vis domestic law, as expressed in Article 27 VCLT. However, the relationship 
between the two kinds of conflicts is more problematic than the straightforward 
application of Article 27 might imply. There are issues relating to the conflict rules 
governing the relationship between norms belonging to different planes (international v 
domestic), the direct enforceability of international norms in monist systems versus the 
legal architecture of dualist systems and finally, the peculiarity of the investment 
regime, conferring locus standi to investors to vindicate a breach of an international 
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treaty, with the difficulties posed by the classification of the investors as possessing 
rights or simply privileges.
96
  
 
Conflicts of international obligations are identified by objective and subjective criteria: 
as for the objective element, conflicts require an overlap ratione materiae, personae and 
temporis, ie for one actor to be bound by two equally valid rules.
97
 The subjective 
criterion element does not meet with the same degree of consensus; according to Jenks, 
‘Conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two 
treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties’.98 
Pauwelyn, in his work on conflict of norms in the WTO regime,
99
 adopted a broader, 
purposive definition, according to which: ‘[...] two norms are [...] in a relationship of 
conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other.’ 100  
 
So, in the strictest view,  if norms in two different treaties are both legal and valid, yet 
they cannot be applied at the same time without incurring in a breach – if, in other 
words, they require the State to perform both ‘A’ and ‘non-A’ one can speak of a 
normative conflict. In the laxer interpretation, potential, not actual, clashes of obligation 
can already be conceptualised as a ‘relationship of conflict’. 
 
Let us assume that a dispute arises for a breach of investment treaty ‘X’ and State ‘A’ 
(defendant) claims the environmental treaty ‘Y’ required the conduct resulting in the 
breach of instrument ‘X’. If the tribunal establishes that instrument ‘X’ prevails, it will 
find in favour of the investor; if the tribunal finds that instrument ‘Y’ prevails, there will 
be no breach for the purposes of the dispute, without prejudice to the responsibility for 
the breach of the other instrument resting with State A and involving either the home 
State of the investor (State ‘B’) or a third State ‘C’. If both norms are valid and 
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applicable to the respective parties, and there is no priority rule, then, according to 
Pauwelyn: ‘It is then up to A to make a political choice as to whether it will comply 
with the AB norm or with the AC norm. The law of treaties does not direct A either 
way.’101  
 
The ILC in its Fragmentation Report adopted a ‘wide notion of conflict as a situation 
where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem’, 
uncoupling the decision-making process of  courts and tribunals from the strictures of 
legal reasoning in the abstract.
102
 The scope of this dissertation does not allow delving 
into the more theoretical aspects of normative conflicts nor on their political 
implications.
103
 For the purposes of the practical resolution of conflicts in a dispute 
settlement environment, a conflict can be said to exist when the simultaneous 
application of two norms will result in a breach of an international obligation.  
 
3.3 Conflict Resolution Techniques 
 
While the interpretative work of court and tribunals can help defuse apparent conflicts, 
the encounter between distinct legal regimes can engender problems of legal interaction 
that are impervious to interpretation.
104
 To this extent, interpretation has the dual 
function of solving apparent conflicts and identifying ‘genuine’ conflicts, ie conflicts 
that cannot be disposed of through an exercise in systemic interpretation and 
identification of a compatible meaning of the clause under examination. 
   
A necessary or inherent conflict in Pauwelyn’s classification – ie, a conflict occurring in 
the application of at least two obligations – will always result in a breach.105 Such a 
conflict can be dealt with by application of the relevant conflict rule, in order to 
determine which rule has priority of application. An informal rule of precedence assigns 
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priority of application to the main sources of international law as listed in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice as the rules applicable by the Court in 
the exercise of its functions.
106
 In case of conflict between a treaty rule derived from an 
investment treaty and a rule of international environmental law, be it customary or 
treaty based, in the first case priority of application cannot be simply given to the 
investment treaty rule – without prejudice to the jurisdictional restrictions and to 
application of any specific savings or conflict clause contained in the treaty – and 
tribunals will have to analyse the relationship under the three main tools available in 
international law for the resolution of normative conflicts: 1) hierarchy (lex superior); 
2) temporality (lex prior or lex posterior); and 3) specificity (lex specialis).
107
 Equally, 
in the case of conflict between two treaty-based rules, the tribunal will be directed to the 
general international law rules on conflict resolution and any available rules in the 
applicable treaty/ies. 
 
3.3.1 Hierarchy (Lex Superior) 
 
The absence of a rigid structure ordering the international legal system does not mean 
that it is completely devoid of some form of recognition of a hierarchical order between 
rules.
108
 Examples of hierarchical rules are Article 103 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, dictating that obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations under other 
international agreements – therefore establishing a rule of priority between conventional 
sources;
109
 Articles 53 and 64 VCLT – establishing criteria for the validity of treaty law 
against the development of customary norms of a peremptory character, such as the 
prohibition of torture;
110
 and finally norms applicable erga omnes – norms whose 
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breach allows all States to invoke responsibility.
111
 The hierarchical relationship 
between these categories is a contested issue: there are instances of imperfect overlap 
(between peremptory norms and erga omnes obligations), lack of ordering between 
peremptory norms, debates on the relationship between Article 103’s priority rule and 
peremptory norms’ validity.112  
 
It is unlikely that erga omnes obligations will ever have a role in investment law given 
its lex specialis status with respect to the rules on responsibility, the character of 
investment treaties as reciprocal synallagmatic instruments and the limited hierarchical 
value of erga omnes rules.
113
 On the other hand, it is conceivable that an ‘Article 103’ 
defence could be raised by a State in the instance of a conflict between obligations 
stemming from a human rights treaty and an investment treaty, to the extent that human 
rights obligations can be put under the ‘umbrella’ of the Charter under its Article 1(3). 
Equally, one can envisage a situation where a State might have to abide by its 
obligations under a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council by prohibiting an 
investment in its territory or preventing its investors from investing in a particular 
country, therefore breaching its obligations under the investment treaty: in this case, 
Article 103 establishes the rule of priority for the State. The decision on the application 
of the ‘correct’ treaty rule does not determine or resolve any potential issues of State 
responsibility, for which due consideration has to be given to the special regime of 
invocation of responsibility enjoyed by the investment dispute settlement system, as 
recognised by the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility in Article 33.
114
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It is not likely that investment protection norms will ever acquire the customary status 
of peremptory norms; therefore, the third kind of hierarchical ordering, based on the 
peremptory character of one of the conflicting norms, has been raised as a possibility 
only in the inverse relationship, of a peremptory norm conflicting with an investment 
provision. However, it is not impossible to imagine an instance where the treatment of a 
foreign investor would involve torture, the rule against which has undisputedly been 
granted peremptory status. In this case, it will be the tribunal to decide if its jurisdiction 
extends to enforcing human rights obligations, an avenue which is unlikely considering 
the jurisdictional limitations preventing a tribunal from considering a human rights 
claim as an independent cause of action.
115
 In fact, the Biloune Tribunal refused to 
entertain the allegation of the investor that the treatment by Ghana constituted a 
violation of his human rights as an independent cause of action, justifying its position in 
the following manner: 
 
This Tribunal’s competence is limited to commercial disputes arising under a contract 
entered into in the context of Ghana’s Investment Code. As noted, the Government 
agreed to arbitrate only disputes ‘in respect of’ the foreign investment. Thus, other 
matters – however compelling the claim or wrongful the alleged act – are outside this 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.116 
 
Alternatively, the alleged torture could be read as a grave breach of the FET standard 
clause of the applicable investment treaty. From the point of view of the investor, 
‘packaging’ the claim as a breach of the investment treaty rather than as a human rights 
violation has the advantage of a better enforcement system guaranteeing  higher level of  
compensation.
117
 In this event, there would be no normative conflict to be solved by 
way of hierarchical ordering but rather, convergence of the human rights and investment 
protection regimes.  
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So far, normative hierarchy has not been raised explicitly in an investment dispute by 
either claimants or defendants; however, the Phoenix Tribunal, dealing with a 
jurisdictional objection centring on the meaning of ‘investment’, added the following 
obiter dictum: 
 
[…] the ICSID Convention’s jurisdictional requirements – as well as those of the BIT – 
cannot be read and interpreted in isolation from public international law, and its general 
principles. To take an extreme example, nobody would suggest that ICSID protection 
should be granted to investments made in violation of the most fundamental rules of 
protection of human rights, like investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide 
or in support of slavery or trafficking of human organs.
118
 
  
This statement raises interesting questions with respect to the status of certain 
fundamental norms of international environmental law, which pertain to the greater 
debate on the criteria for identification of peremptory norms. The proposal has been 
advanced that some environmental norms do enjoy jus cogens status, but this can be 
considered only speculative at this stage and has not received acceptance beyond the 
academic community;
119
 in any event, the Phoenix Tribunal was rather more concerned, 
in its dictum, with the issue of denying the protection of the treaty to an investment 
made in violation of a peremptory norm: this approach is not too different from a 
normal jurisdictional objection with respect to investments made in violation to the host 
State’s domestic law, in analogy to ordre public or public policy arguments.120 A jus 
cogens exception to the validity of a treaty does not concern the behaviour of a 
particular investor – for example, the use of slave labour in a mine – or the 
interpretation of the treaty language to cover a particular investment – as noted by the 
Phoenix Tribunal – but more fundamentally, raises issues of validity or termination of 
the investment treaty against the existence or the emergence of a peremptory norm. It is 
submitted that this eventuality is even less likely to occur than the possibility that the 
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behaviour of the investor might be in violation of a peremptory norm of international 
law, depriving him of the protection of the investment treaty, whose validity would not 
be in question. In other words, it would be quite difficult to envisage an investment 
treaty including a provision conflicting with a peremptory norm or concluded with the 
purpose of violating such a norm which would raise issues of normative conflicts under 
the law of treaties.   
 
3.3.2 Temporality (Lex Posterior and Lex Prior) 
 
In order to establish priority of applicability of two valid norms, their temporal 
relationship can be taken into consideration, according to the maxim lex posterior 
derogat [legi] priori. Article 30 VCLT reflects some elements of this maxim, 
establishing, at paragraph 3, a presumption of priority of the later agreement, which can 
be rebutted if it can be established that the intent of the parties did not match the 
presumption.
121
 The priority rules expressed in Article 30 are as follows: 
 
1. If there is an express savings clause in the successive treaty establishing a rule of 
precedence between the two (either by the lex posterior or the lex prior rule), this shall 
apply and the treaty given precedence will prevail in the relationship between the parties 
(lex specialis rule, Article 30 paragraph 2);  
2.   if there is complete coincidence ratione personae, then the lex posterior rule 
applies, and the earlier treaty remains applicable only to the extent of its consistency to 
the later treaty (Article 30 paragraph 3); 
3. if there is no complete coincidence ratione personae, paragraph 3 applies only to 
parties to both treaties, while the treaty common to both parties governs their 
relationship; 
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4. paragraph 5 of Article 30 clarifies that these rules are without prejudice to any 
question of state responsibility arising from the conclusion or application of a treaty 
incompatible with a previous obligation, as already noted above.  
 
Clearly, the overlap between treaties relating to different subject matters, between 
different parties, concluded over time and containing no conflict resolution clauses, or 
conflicting or ambiguous ones, remains a distinct possibility. Inter-regime conflicts, or 
conflicts between treaties amongst different parties,
122
 cannot easily be tackled by a 
technical rule such as the lex posterior; rather the rule becomes subordinated to other 
criteria, such as the distinction between ‘integral’ and ‘reciprocal’ obligations, where 
typically, in an inter-regime conflict such as the one between environmental and 
investment obligations, the environmental obligations will be contained in a multilateral 
treaty of the integral kind, the investment obligations in a bilateral treaty of the 
reciprocal kind.
123
 Already in 1966, the International Law Commission acknowledged 
that integral treaty obligations are better dealt as a matter of the law of State 
responsibility.
124
 The more recent FTAs plus, combining investment, trade and social 
goals (such as sustainable development, environmental protection and labour rights) are 
more likely to contain express conflict clauses, as the NAFTA on which they are 
modeled. If there are no express provisions, the issue of compatibility is dealt with 
provision-by-provision as per Article 30(1); this might be relevant for the application of 
the ‘subject matter’ criterion, whereby the provisions, rather than the treaty as a whole, 
have to share the same subject matter. 
 
In an older contract-based investment arbitration, the Tribunal took into consideration 
the temporal dimension of the applicable law.
125
 The dispute concerned the 
development of an hotel complex in Egypt, which was blocked by the Egyptian 
government on account of several irregularities, and justified under the 1975 UNESCO 
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Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage which 
imposed, according to Egypt, an international obligation to prevent the development on 
the sites of the Pyramids, registered as sites protected under the Convention (at Article 
11) as of 1979. The Tribunal partially accepted the submission by the Respondent that 
the cancellation of the project was obligatory under the UNESCO Convention, and 
therefore it used the date, 1979, in which the site was registered – and therefore, in its 
reasoning, the obligation became binding on the Respondent – in order to calculate the 
lucrum cessans, using the temporal dimension of the obligation in the assessment of the 
quantum. The Tribunal therefore derived some consequences from the application of the 
UNESCO Convention and used temporality as the criterion to establish when the 
Convention became binding and superseded the obligation to compensate the investor 
for the lucrum cessans. 
 
In another recent arbitration, the Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection based on 
its accession to the EU, which, it argued, terminated the applicable BIT (as per Article 
59 VCLT) or rendered its arbitration clause inapplicable (as per Article 30(3) VCLT).
126
 
The debate on the relationship between the EU and the investment treaty regime is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, as well as the discussion on the termination of the 
BIT under Article 59 VCLT (an objection that the Tribunal rejected).
127
 The objection 
raised under Article 30(3) by the Defendant was disposed of summarily by the Tribunal, 
as it did not agree that EU law precluded the recourse to international arbitration where 
one of the parties is not a State and in any event, it ruled that issues of incompatibility 
were to be dealt with at the merits stage and did not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction 
(unless the arbitrability clause itself were to be found to be incompatible with EU law, 
which it found not to be the case).
128
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3.3.3 Specificity (Lex Specialis) 
 
The VCLT does not contain a specific provision on lex specialis, which constitutes the 
other major criterion for the resolution on normative conflicts based on the principle of 
specificity (as between general law and an interpretation or exception to it, or between 
two special provisions).
129
  
 
 While it is more likely for a special rule to develop and be agreed after a general rule, it 
does not necessarily follow that the lex specialis rule is never applicable or it is subject 
to the lex posterior rule.
130
 However, while the lex specialis rule allows to establish an 
‘informal hierarchy’131 in which the rule that is dis-applied in the particular instance 
remains in the background, in the case of the temporality rule, the ‘losing’ rule loses its 
validity altogether, at least as concerns the relation between the parties to both rules, 
and it is not simply dis-applied in the specific dispute. Furthermore, the relational 
character of the general/special distinction
132
 does not allow, it seems, for an application 
of lex specialis as a discrete self-standing criterion for the resolution of a potential 
conflict, but points to its usefulness rather as an interpretative principle than as a 
conflict rule. The ILC goes as far as to say that this principle ‘cannot be meaningfully 
codified.’133 This is especially so as long as one attributes to the rule the double function 
of distinguishing between general and particular in a cumulative as well as in an 
exclusionary way, ie both in order to select a more specific rule against a more general 
one within the same field of application, or to isolate one specific regime from its more 
general normative environment. As an example one can look at the codification by the 
ILC in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, at Article 55 (Lex Specialis): ‘These 
articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a state are governed by special rules of international law’.134 
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The most straightforward application of the rule is in the context of two related treaties, 
one of which is of a more general nature and the other more specific: for example, a 
treaty implementing the obligations set out in the ‘framework’ treaty or a treaty that sets 
out in more detail the general terms of a previous agreement,
135
 or more generally, when 
considering the obligations contained in a treaty in the context of international law, as 
stated by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case:136 
 
It is of cardinal importance that the Court has found that the 1977 Treaty is still in force 
and consequently governs the relationship between the Parties. That relationship is also 
determined by the rules of other relevant conventions to which the two States are party, 
by the rules of general international law and, in this particular case, by the rules of State 
responsibility; but it is governed, above all, by the applicable rules of the 1977 Treaty as 
a lex specialis.   
 
The lex specialis criterion has been especially relevant in the context of the attribution 
and invocation of State responsibility and, in the investment treaty arbitration context, 
in dealing with countermeasures.
137
 This application of the criterion is germane to the 
acceptance of a heightened lex specialis form establishing ‘self-contained regimes’ with 
their own independent rules of State responsibility.
138
 It is self-evident that the 
investment regime, with its own system of dispute settlement and, at least in its ICSID 
guise, the exclusion of the recourse to diplomatic protection, seems to qualify as one 
such regime.
139
 Nonetheless, the permanence of general rules of international law, 
including its rules of State responsibility, as fall-back rules, seems equally 
uncontentious.
140
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Under a less demanding reading of the lex specialis rule, as an ‘interlinked series of 
primary and secondary rules,’ devoid of any strict ‘self-contained’ character, these 
regimes share an ‘ethos’ but remain open to interpretation under general international 
law.
141
 The uncontested assertion that IIAs constitute lex specialis with respect to 
general international law – as illustrated most forcefully by the debate on the 
relationship between the treaty and customary standard of treatment for investors – does 
not take us very far in solving a conflict where compliance with a treaty norm in the IIA 
results in a breach of an environmental treaty, or vice-versa; this leaves unresolved the 
issue of conflict resolution by application of the lex specialis rule, as these regimes 
cannot be considered closed legal circuits to the extent that are impervious to other legal 
obligations, even if they have been treated as such by several tribunals. Only a 
combination of the lex specialis and lex superior criteria, whereby a special regime 
arrogates for itself superior status with reference with another potentially conflicting 
regime as a matter of jurisdictional reach – much like the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) is wont to do – might guarantee the legal, if not political, resolution of any 
conflict between regimes.
142
 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Two main approaches can be identified for the resolution of normative conflicts:  
avoidance – with the tools of inter-State negotiations, treaty drafting and diplomatic 
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side, the first dispute to address this relationship was Eastern Sugar BV (Netherlands) v The Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, SCC no 088/2004, Partial Award (27 March 2007). See 
Michele Potestá, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the European Union – Recent Developments in 
Arbitration and Before the ECJ’, (2009) 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 225. See more recently AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü KFT v The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/22, Award (23 September 2010) Section 7.2. 
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settlement – and management – with the tools available in investor-State arbitrations, ie 
interpretation and conflict resolution. The avoidance route is heavily dependent on State 
intervention, at the political level of policy-making, at the diplomatic level of inter-State 
relations, or finally, at the legal level of treaty-drafting and legislative action. It suffers 
from the downsides of State intervention, in that it is slow and risks damaging investors 
in the process, as direct third party beneficiary of the rights granted in the treaties.
143
 It 
is also State-driven and based on public international law principles such as sovereign 
equality and good faith. The political will of States is necessary in order to initiate 
investment treaties’ amendments, facilitating compliance with non-investment 
obligations and creating the policy space necessary for the implementation of 
environmental measures. It is, by and large, the approach favoured in North America 
and in the NAFTA zone specifically; this is evidenced by the amendments by the 
United States and Canada of their model BITs in order to clarify the extent of certain 
provisions and the relationship between treaty and custom with respect to standards of 
treatment of foreign investors.
144
 There is very little empirical research on the effect of 
the avoidance route on normative conflicts and more work needs to be done in this 
area.
145
   
 
The management route is less dependent on States, as it is contextual to investment 
arbitration, where the tribunals, as agents,
146
 are to a large part in control of the process 
and therefore of the outcome. While the avoidance route suffers from the downsides of 
the State-centred approach, the management route suffers from the downsides of a 
diffused, non-hierarchical approach out-with the direct control of the States: lack of 
consistency in the jurisprudence, absence of a clear democratic mandate for the 
tribunals and of clear division of competences. In fact, a more heuristically fruitful way 
                                                 
143
 Raising issues of legitimate expectations and detrimental reliance; see also Wälde (n 32) 765. 
144
 2004 US Model BIT, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf; 2004 Canada Model 
FIPA, http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.  
145
 Partially because it is a comparatively recent development in investment law; a notable example is 
Article 1.2(3) of the 2015 Australia-China FTA: ‘In the event of any inconsistency between this 
Agreement and any other multilateral or bilateral agreement to which both Parties are party, the 
Parties shall immediately consult with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution’. This 
contrasts with similar previous clauses, such as Article 103 of the NAFTA, which gave primacy to 
the NAFTA in the event of inconsistency.  
146
 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Arbitration and Judicialization’ (2011) 1(9) Oñati Socio-Legal Series; Alec Stone 
Sweet and Florian Grisel, ‘Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to 
Constitutionalization?’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, and Francesco Francioni, 
Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 118; Anne van Aaken, 
‘Control Mechanisms in International Investment Law’, in Douglas and others (n 10) 409.  
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to consider normative conflicts is to envisage them as conflicts of jurisdiction and 
competence between judicial bodies, international courts and tribunals. To the extent 
that this work takes the internal point of view in this respect, and considers the way in 
which investment tribunals deal with normative conflicts, it eschews the jurisdictional 
question; its relevance, however, should not be underestimated.
147
 
 
In this dissertation the focus is unequally distributed, with an overall concentration on 
the management route (the work of tribunals); a heightened focus again on the 
management route in the first part, to the extent that interpretation and conflict 
resolutions with the tools available in the VCLT are activities undertaken by tribunals; 
and a slightly higher focus on avoidance in the last part, as the inclusion of conflict 
clauses in the treaties is due to the drafting efforts of States, but the application in a 
dispute context is again the task of tribunals.   
 
The table in the following page summarises the forms of action that can be taken by 
States and by tribunals in order to address the challenges raised by normative conflicts 
and it constitutes a useful summary of the avoidance and management routes. In bold in 
the table the actions undertaken by tribunals, and underlined the topics that are covered 
in this work, as a reminder of the further avenues for research in the direction of the 
construction of a complete taxonomy in the study of normative conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147
 See for example the acute remarks by James Crawford, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity in International 
Dispute Settlement: An Inaugural Lecture’ (2009) 1(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1, 
19. 
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PREVENTIVE (TREATY 
DRAFTING) 
CONTEXTUAL (IN DISPUTE) REMEDIAL (POST-
DISPUTE) 
 
Amendment 
Preamble  
Authoritative 
statements 
 
Ad hoc  
 
Challenge of award 
Substantive 
clauses 
Institutional  
(eg NAFTA) 
Conflict 
clauses 
ISDS clauses Unilateral 
Termination Consultation on draft award Comments to award 
Model IIAs Intervention by non-disputing 
parties
148
 
Appeal system 
Protocols and Annexes Renvoi by tribunals   
Non-binding instruments Recourse to traveaux 
preparatoires 
 
Side agreements Intervention by negotiators  
 Forensic interpretation  
 Conflict resolution techniques  
 
The following chapter is dedicated to a review of the conflicts clauses in IIAs, one of 
the main tools available to States to avoid and manage successfully normative conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148
 For example as provided for expressly in Article 9.16(2) of the 2015 Australia-China FTA: ‘The non-
disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding the interpretation of 
this Chapter’. This clause was already available in NAFTA, as Article 1128, but was subordinated to 
written notice to the disputing parties. 
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4. Chapter 4 – Conflicts in IIAs 
 
4.1 Conflict Clauses 
 
Chapter 3 contained a a review of the available techniques for conflict resolution that 
can be adopted by tribunals faced with a pure normative conflict, ie, a conflict of 
international obligations. One of the conclusions reached from that examination was 
that the most efficient way to deal with these conflicts, and one freer from ambiguities 
and therefore providing a higher degree of predictability, consists in the insertion of 
conflict rules in the applicable IIA. These conflict clauses can be designed to deal with 
pre-existing treaties, future treaties or even regulate conflicts within the same treaty. 
Additionally, they can directly refer to conflicting environmental (or other, especially 
trade) obligations, or generally establish a hierarchy between treaties (by reference to 
technical conflict rules such as lex specialis or lex posterior). Their success is highly 
dependent from the clarity of their language, as they are subject to the interpretation of 
tribunals and therefore open to the usual interpretative issues.  
 
IIAs contain two kinds of conflict clauses: the first one is a conflict clause proper, 
establishing a hierarchy of application between international obligations; the second 
kind does not aim at solving normative conflicts by way of exclusion, but rather has the 
more limited function of enhancing the mutual supportiveness of international 
obligations through soft law clauses – ie not establishing binding obligations for the 
States, but promoting or supporting a certain behaviour with respect to substantive 
regimes external to the investment regime.
149
 To this extent, these clauses are similar to 
the balancing clauses also contained in IIA at least since the NAFTA.
150
 The difference 
                                                 
149
 The importance of mutual supportiveness, underpinning the basic presumption against conflict, has 
been recognised widely. Additionally, the residual character of Article 30 VCLT, whereby specific 
provisions on compatibility in the applicable treaty would prevail, was recognised by the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Second Session, 91
st
 Meeting 
(Waldock). 
150
 See for example Article 1114 (Environmental Measures) NAFTA: ‘1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise 
consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 2. The Parties recognize that 
it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that 
another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party 
and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.’ 
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between ‘mutual supportiveness clauses’ and ‘balancing clauses’ rests in the fact that 
the first are aimed at international non-investment obligations, while balancing clauses 
are directed at domestic policy measures. Conversely, the pure conflict clauses find 
their correspondent in the ‘police powers’ exception clauses (or other forms of carve-
out and/or exception clauses as those allowing environmental performance 
requirements, which are normally prohibited) at the domestic level. Given the different 
hierarchical position of international and domestic law, reflected in Article 27 VCLT, 
domestic law can be internationalised via the police powers doctrine, whereby certain 
sovereign acts on the domestic plane are granted, by way of exception, the status of a 
customary international principle, allowing the linkage at the international level 
between the treaty obligation and the impugned governmental measure. However, a too 
strict categorisation of the clauses around this taxonomy does not reflect the reality of 
treaty drafting, as there are examples of mixed clauses – supportiveness and balancing, 
or international and domestic – neither does it reflect the reality of arbitral practice, 
whereby what is constructed as an argument around normative conflict by the 
respondent, might be reframed as decision based on mutual supportiveness by the 
tribunal. Another observable phenomenon is the tendency of respondent States to 
employ police powers arguments rather than normative conflicts arguments as 
defences.
151
 The following table provides a possible categorisation of IIAs clauses 
dealing with mixed domestic-international conflicts and purely international conflicts.  
 
 Mixed conflicts Pure international conflicts 
Hard law Police powers/exceptions/carve-
outs/ 
performance requirements 
Conflicts clauses 
Soft law Balancing clauses Mutual supportiveness clauses/ 
soft law clauses 
  
Generic conflict clauses of the first kind, establishing a clear hierarchy, but without 
expressly including environmental treaties in their purview, are often included, but are 
constrained, implicitly or explicitly, by the limitations of Article 30 VCLT on subject-
matter. For example, Article 80 (Obligations under Other International, Regional or 
Bilateral Agreements) of the 2000 Singapore-New Zealand FTA provides: 
 
                                                 
151
 For example in Suez v Argentina (n 81) para 102. 
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Nothing in this Agreement shall be regarded as exempting either Party to this 
Agreement from its obligations under any international, regional or bilateral agreements 
to which it is a party and any inconsistency with the provisions of this Agreement shall 
be resolved in accordance with the general principles of international law.
152
 
 
More clearly worded savings clauses were introduced with the NAFTA and are 
incorporated into more recent FTAs that follow its model. 
 
4.1.1 The NAFTA 
 
Treaty practice in drafting conflict clauses of the first kind and dealing with different 
subject matters is particularly rare and does not move much beyond the North American 
area, starting with the most influential FTA of the second period, the NAFTA.
153
 At the 
top of the attention of the NAFTA drafters was the relationship between the NAFTA 
and the WTO Agreement, which was being negotiated at the same time.
154
 This is 
reflected in the insertion of  Article 103: Relation to Other Agreements, which provides: 
 
1. The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other agreements to which such 
Parties are party. 
2. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such other agreements, 
this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise 
provided in this Agreement.
 155
 
                                                 
152
 Singapore-New Zealand Closer Partnership Agreement, 14 November 2000, 2203 UNTS 129. See also 
Article 1.3 of the 2005 Singapore-Korea FTA and Article 16.5 of the 2006 Singapore-India FTA.   
153
 Priority rules for the ‘more favourable treaty’ are more common, including for treaties of the first 
period. 
154
 The issue of regionalism with respect of the WTO Agreements has attracted a lot of attention; see by 
way of introduction the information on the WTO webpage, at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm>, accessed 16 December 2015. The 
WTO General Council established a Committee on Regional Trade Agreements in 1996; See also 
Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 
(OUP 2006).  
155
 According to Article 30(3) VCLT, the WTO Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1995, 
should take precedence over the NAFTA, which had entered into force a year earlier. However, 
Article 103 NAFTA provides for a special regime of precedence, without expressly stating if this 
includes also later agreements. Article 301(1) NAFTA defines the relationship between the relevant 
chapter of the NAFTA and the GATT and other successor agreements; it is arguable e contrario that 
Article 103 does not establish any rule of precedence with respect to successive agreements. 
Furthermore, the WTO Agreements incorporate GATT 1947 without amendments; therefore, it can 
be considered lex prior within the meaning of Article 303(3) VCLT. In any event, there remains a 
certain amount of uncertainty over the relationship between the NAFTA and the totality of the WTO 
Agreements.  
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The difficulty in applying Article 103(2), as noted in the footnote, might go some way 
in explaining why the 2014 Consolidated Text of the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) still leaves the language of the corresponding 
article to be determing in the conclusive phase of negotiations.
156
 
 
Article 104: Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements, sets up specific 
conflict rules for environmental instruments and creates an exception from the general 
rule established in Article 103: 
 
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade 
obligations set out in: 
(a) Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973; 
(b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at 
Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990;  
(c) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, done at Basel, March 22, 1989, upon its entry into force for 
Canada, Mexico and the United States; or  
(d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,
157
 
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where a 
Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of 
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least 
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement. 
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment 
to the agreements listed in paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation 
agreement. 
 
In Chapter Eleven, Article 1112: Relationship to Other Chapters, regulates possible 
conflicts within the NAFTA at paragraph (1): ‘In the event of any inconsistency 
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 See Article X.04(2) of the Consolidated CETA Text, published 26 September 2014, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.  
157
 The Annex includes The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed at 
Ottawa, October 28, 1986 and The Agreement Between the United States of America and the United 
Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the 
Border Area, signed at La Paz, Baja California Sur, August 14, 1983. 
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between a provision of this Chapter and a provision of another Chapter, the provision of 
the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.’ 
 
NAFTA’s Articles 103 and 104 are conflict rules designed to establish normative 
priority and as such they are supposed to direct States in their performance of the 
treaties obligations; further, they might be applied in case of inter-States disputes under 
Chapter 20 (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures). Article 
2001 established the Free Trade Commission, whose interpretations are binding on 
investment tribunals in accordance with Article 1131(2). Article 2005 confers a certain 
degree of discretionality to disputing parties as to the choice of forum, be it either the 
NAFTA or the GATT 1947/GATT 1994, with some exceptions, including for actions 
subject to Article 104, where NAFTA is the only forum available. The scope of the 
dispute settlement facilities under Chapter 11 and their relationship with the Agreement 
are set out in Article 1115: Purpose, which provides: 
 
Without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under Chapter Twenty 
(Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures), this Section 
establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both 
equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of 
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal. 
 
According to Article 1131: Governing Law, the NAFTA itself and applicable rules of 
international law govern disputes arising under the Agreement.
158
 The direct 
applicability of Article 104 to disputes arising under Chapter 11 has to take into account 
that the Article deals with ‘specific trade obligations’ in a list of environmental 
agreements prevailing over the NAFTA (‘this Agreement’); this is a classic case of lex 
specialis, whereby specific trade clauses in environmental agreements will prevail over 
general trade clauses in the NAFTA. The article raises interesting questions as to the 
applicability of the lex specialis rules across regimes – whereby environmental trade 
rules constitute lex specialis with respect to general trade rules,
159
 allowing 
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 The jurisdiction of NAFTA tribunals is limited to breaches of Section A of Chapter 11 and Articles 
1503(2) and 1502(3)(a) of Chapter 15, as established at Article 1116.  
159
 One could think, for example, of the emission trading regime under Kyoto, as a form of lex specialis, 
covering environmental trade. See also Marie-Claire Cordonnier Segger and Markus Gerhing, ‘Trade 
and Investment Implications of Carbon Trading for Sustainable Development,’ in David Freestone 
and Charlotte Streck, Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading (OUP 2009) 77, 86.  
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environmental obligations to enter the trade regime – but at the same time seems of 
difficult application in a conflict between an investment obligation and a trade 
obligation in the prevailing environmental treaty, unless one argues that by ‘specific 
trade obligations’ the NAFTA drafters intended ‘specific trade and investment 
obligations’ in environmental treaties or that a purposive interpretation of the 
environmental treaty will include investment practices that might have an effect on the 
environment of the kind prohibited by the environmental treaty.  
 
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation is the environmental 
side agreement to the NAFTA and also came into force on 1 January 1994.
160
 Amongst 
its objectives, listed in Article 1, is: ‘[to] support the environmental goals and objectives 
of the NAFTA,’ reaffirming the presumption of mutual supportiveness intrinsic to 
international law. Its Article 40: Relation to Other Environmental Agreements, regulates 
the relationship between this ancillary agreement to the NAFTA, subjecting it to other 
environmental agreements to which the NAFTA states might be parties: ‘Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to affect the existing rights and obligations of the Parties 
under other international environmental agreements, including conservation agreements, 
to which such Parties are party.’ There are several other provisions in the NAAEC that 
function as coordinating measures between the NAFTA and the NAAEC, introduced in 
response to the demands and concerns of environmental organisations, and they belong 
to the second typology, of mutual supportiveness.
161
 For example Article 10(3) on the 
functions of the Council (one of the three bodies comprising the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, or CEC) provides: 
 
3. The Council shall strengthen cooperation on the development and continuing 
improvement of environmental laws and regulations, including by: 
a. promoting the exchange of information on criteria and methodologies used in 
establishing domestic environmental standards; and 
                                                 
160
 The negotiating history of the NAFTA reveals the impact of environmental concerns and explains the 
resort to environmental and labour side-agreements as a strategic choice to guarantee the success of 
the NAFTA, advanced most successfully by the then presidential candidate Bill Clinton. Amongst 
the considerable literature reflecting on this relationship, see Gary C Hufbauer and Others, NAFTA 
and the Environment: Seven Years Later (Institute for International Economics 2000); Carolyn L 
Deere and Daniel C Esty (eds), Greening the Americas: NAFTA’s Lessons for Hemispheric Trade 
(MIT Press 2002); David L Markell and John H Knox, Greening NAFTA: The North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Stanford University Press 2003).  
161
 See Markell and Knox, above, 9 ff.  
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b. without reducing levels of environmental protection, establishing a process for 
developing recommendations on greater compatibility of environmental technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures in a manner consistent 
with the NAFTA. 
 
Article 10(6) explicitly links the international obligation of mutual supportiveness with 
the balancing between domestic measures and international obligations allowed in 
Article 1114 NAFTA: 
 
6. The Council shall cooperate with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to achieve the 
environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA by: 
a. acting as a point of inquiry and receipt for comments from non-governmental 
organizations and persons concerning those goals and objectives; 
b. providing assistance in consultations under Article 1114 of the NAFTA where a 
Party considers that another Party is waiving or derogating from, or offering to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, an environmental measure as an encouragement to establish, 
acquire, expand or retain an investment of an investor, with a view to avoiding any such 
encouragement; 
c. contributing to the prevention or resolution of environment-related trade disputes by: 
a. seeking to avoid disputes between the Parties, 
b. making recommendations to the Free Trade Commission with respect to the 
avoidance of such disputes, and 
c. identifying experts able to provide information or technical advice to NAFTA 
committees, working groups and other NAFTA bodies; 
d. considering on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of the NAFTA; and 
e. otherwise assisting the Free Trade Commission in environment-related matters. 
 
The following section contains a selection of cases arising under the NAFTA that 
presented an environmental element. As noted at the beginning of this work, it is within 
the NAFTA framework that the tension between these substantive regimes first acquired 
relevance. It is therefore appropriate to analyse the reaction of tribunals when faced with 
issues of normative conflicts in this area. 
 
4.1.2 SD Myers v Canada 
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On the first cases that arose from the NAFTA’s Chapter 11 is the SD Myers case.162 SD 
Myers Inc (SDMI) is an American company based in Ohio, involved in the remediation 
of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) from oil and related equipment. PCB is a highly 
toxic material, and its treatment and cross-border transport is strictly regulated both 
internationally and domestically, including via a prohibition on transport between the 
US and Canada. In the 1990s, as its market share in the US diminished, SDMI decided 
to expand its activities in the Canadian market, importing PCB waste from Canada for 
treatment in its US facilities. The NAFTA claim was initiated because of a temporary 
ban on the export of the PCB issued by the Canadian government in 1995. SDMI had 
lobbied both in the US and Canada to lift import restrictions on PBA and had obtained 
an ‘enforcement discretion’ from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
allowing it to export the PCB from Canada.
163
 The enforcement discretion was replaced 
with an Import for Disposal Rule on 18 March 1996. The EPA had acted without 
consulting with the Canadian authorities, which responded with the export ban. SDMI 
claimed the real reason for the ban was the desire of the Canadian government to protect 
its domestic PCB-disposal industry. The border was opened again for export of PCB 
into the US in February 1997, and then closed permanently in July of the same year, 
following a decision of the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal overturning the EPA’s 
Import for Disposal Rule.  
 
The case raised several issues of conflicting international obligations. In 1989 Canada 
had ratified the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes (the Convention); however the United States had not it ratified yet, 
so Article 104 NAFTA, which is applicable when all NAFTA parties have ratified the 
Convention, was not applicable in the relation between the parties.
164
 Article 4(5) of the 
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 SD Myers v Canada (n 72); for commentaries on the case, see John De Pencier, ‘Investment, 
Environment and Dispute Settlement: Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, (1999-2000) 23 
Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 409; Brian Trevor Hodges, ‘Where the Grass is 
Always Greener: Foreign Investors’ Actions Against Environmental Regulations Under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11, S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada’ (2001) XIV Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 367; David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization (CUP 2008) 86 ff. 
163
 As explained by the Tribunal: ‘The term “enforcement discretion” is not defined in U.S. law, but 
apparently means that the US EPA would not to enforce the U.S. regulations banning importation of 
PCBs against SDMI, provided that SDMI met the detailed conditions that were attached to the US 
EPA’s October 26, 1995 letter (which included “no landfilling”). The import ban itself would remain 
in place and any imports to the USA technically would be contrary to U.S. law’. SD Myers v Canada 
(n 72) para 119. 
164
 Arguably, Article 18 VCLT would enjoin the US to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty, but the limit of this obligations are not clear cut; see for example Paolo 
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Convention prohibits the export and import of hazardous wastes from and to States that 
are not party to it.
165
 Since the United States had not ratified the Convention, Article 
4(5) identified it as a non-Party, and should have prevented the export of PCB into its 
territory. However, the Convention allows, at Article 11(1), for the Parties to enter into 
arrangements with other Parties or non-Parties for the transboundary movement of 
hazardous waste, provided these arrangements do not derogate from the standards set by 
the Convention. One such arrangement, the Transboundary Agreement, had been 
entered into by the US and Canada in 1986;
166
 its Article 2 (General Obligation) allows 
for the transboundary import, export and transit of hazardous waste pursuant to 
domestic law, regulations and administrative practices.
167
 Canada argued that this 
agreement did not cover PCB because it was not classified as ‘hazardous waste’ in the 
US;
168
 therefore, Canada’s position was that the prohibition at Article 4(5) of the 
Convention remained applicable.  
 
As noted, US legislation prohibited the trans-border transportation of PCB
169
 and the 
1995 Canadian Interim Order, confirmed later in the year by a Final Order, banned the 
export of PCB. The EPA’s Enforcement Discretion and Import Disposal Rule were 
subject to judicial review proceedings, with the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturning them for being ultra vires, following a petition by the environmental NGO 
Sierra Club in which SDMI participated as an intervener.
170
 At the time SDMI served its 
                                                                                                                                               
Palchetti, ‘Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention: A Vague and Ineffective Obligation or a 
Useful Means of Strengthening Legal Cooperation?’, in Cannizzaro (n 25) 25; Oliver Dörr and 
Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A Commentary (Springer 2011) 
219. 
165
 See SD Myers v Canada (n 72) para 106. Article 11 of the Basel Convention allows for shipment of 
hazardous waste to non-parties if there are bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements not less 
stringent than the Basel convention (such as the Transboundary Agreement). 
166
 SD Myers v Canada (n 72) para 103. Article 2 of the Agreement allows the export, import and transit 
of hazardous waste across the border.  
167
 In addition, Article 11 specifically subjects the Agreement to the applicable laws and regulations of the 
Parties. 
168
 Article 1(Definitions) of the Agreement provides: ‘Hazardous Waste means with respect to Canada, 
hazardous waste, and with respect to the United States, hazardous waste subject to a manifest 
requirement in the United States, as defined by their respective national legislations and 
implementing regulations.’ The US clarified that PCBs were hazardous waste within the meaning of 
the Agreement via diplomatic note to the Canadian government on 24 January 1996 (para 103).  
169
 Chiefly, for the purposes of this case, the US 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act, USC §§ 2601-2692, 
which contains a categorical ban on the production and import of PCB, with very limited exceptions, 
and which was overridden, without authority, as established by judicial review, see infra, by the EPA 
through its enforcement discretion. In Canada, the government had added PCBs in 1977 to the list of 
toxic substances in the Environmental Contaminants Act (now superseded by the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act or CEPA), supplemented by the PCB Waste Export Regulations 1990. 
170
 Sierra Club v EPA, 118 F 3d 1324, 1327 (9
th
 Cir 1997). 
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Notice of Intent, it could not, as a matter of US law, have imported PCB in the United 
States for treatment.
171
 Effectively, the Tribunal penalised Canada for having enforced a 
ban that was consistent with US law, and not at variance with it. While Article 27 would 
have prevented Canada for using the provisions of its own domestic laws to justify the 
breach of an international commitment under the NAFTA, ordre public and comity 
could be construed as a legitimate excuse for its enforcement action; it is partially on 
these grounds that Canada challenged the Partial Award in its Federal Court under 
Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of its Commercial Arbitration Code.
172
 The Court dismissed the 
application for lack of jurisdiction and in any event stated that ‘[it] could not conclude 
that any aspect of the Tribunal’s decision conflicted with Canadian public policy.’173  
 
On the substance of the normative conflict claim raised by Canada, which argued that 
its obligations under the Basel Convention relieved it of its duties towards SDMI to the 
extent that they existed at all,
174
 the Tribunal considered that the Transboundary 
Agreement was an agreement within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention and 
therefore Article 4(5) did not apply;
175
 that, in any event, Article 104 NAFTA was not 
applicable; and finally, to the extent that Article 104 incorporated the Transboundary 
Agreement in Article 104 Annex, that, in order to comply with Article 104(1), Canada 
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 In its Memorial on the Merits of 20 July 1999, at 15, SDMI claimed that ‘the Court’s decision did not 
affect the ability of the EPA to grant individual enforcement discretions to companies such as S.D. 
Myers, Inc.’ This is technically true, but the 9th Circuit Court made it clear that the EPA only had the 
power to grant exemptions to the import ban of no more than one year, and given the ruling of the 
Court, it seemed clear that this would not be renewable (At section III: Thus the absolute ban on 
manufacturing PCBs includes an absolute ban on their import, and EPA may not promulgate a rule 
governing the disposal of PCBs that would violate this categorical ban. There is, however, a lone 
exception to TSCA’s broad ban on the manufacture and import of PCBs. TSCA § 6(e)(3)(B)(i) 
provides that the EPA Administrator may grant an exemption if the Administrator determines that 
“an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment would not result. Such exemption may not 
last for more than one year.” EPA, therefore, may not promulgate-as it did here-a rule to dispose of 
PCBs which allows parties to “continue importing [PCBs] indefinitely without interruption.” The 
point is also forcefully made by the Canadian Alliance on Trade and Environment in its amicus 
submission to the Tribunal. 
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 Federal Court – Trial Division, Notice of Application T-225-01, 8 February 2001. Canada challenged 
the award under the code for being ‘in conflict with the public policy of Canada.’ 
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 The Attorney General of Canada v SD Myers Inc, 2004 FC 38.  
174
 Canada raised a jurisdictional objection to the effect that SDMI was not an investor and that there was 
no covered investment, and that its Interim Order affected trade and not investment, so that Chapter 
3 of the NAFTA was applicable, and, in case of conflict between Chapter Eleven and another 
Chapter of the NAFTA, the other chapter prevailed to the extent of the inconsistency. 
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 The Tribunal quotes to this effect the Report issues by the NAFTA Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation on the Status of PCB Management in North America; SD Myers v Canada (n 72) para 
213, n 36.  
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would have to have chosen the measures that are ‘most consistent with open trade’, 
which it had failed to do;
176
 and finally that,  
 
Even if the Basel Convention were to have been ratified by the NAFTA Parties, it 
should not be presumed that CANADA would have been able to use it to justify the 
breach of a specific NAFTA provision because […] where a party has a choice among 
equally effective and reasonably available alternatives for complying […] with a Basel 
Convention obligation, it is obliged to choose the alternative that is […] least 
inconsistent […] with the NAFTA. If one such alternative were to involve no 
inconsistency with the Basel Convention, clearly this should be followed.
177
 [emphasis 
added]. 
 
While the Tribunal did engage with the international responsibilities of the defendant 
arising from its international obligation, and referred approvingly to the principle of 
mutual supportiveness between environmental protection and economic development, 
ultimately the attempt of the claimant to link its domestic measures with its international 
obligations was unsuccessful.
178
 Beyond the controversy around the application of trade 
law standards of review, it remains one of the few investment law arbitrations to 
meaningfully engage with issues of environmental regulation and sustainable 
development derived from international obligations.
179
 
 
4.1.3 Chemtura v Canada 
 
In the Chemtura Arbitration, the Respondent State, Canada, successfully argued for the 
legitimacy of its domestic measures resulting in the banning of the product Lindane 
because of the underlying international environmental obligations under Annex II of the 
Aarhus Protocol.
180
 The Claimant’s argument on the breach of the FET standard was 
structured around six specific measures that were challenged under that heading; the 
first measure was the review of the product requested by Canada. Contextually to the 
main claim that the review was vitiated by due process breaches, the Claimant alleged 
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 ibid, para 221. 
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 ibid, para 215. 
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 ibid, para 220. See also Viñuales (n 81) 250. 
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 Riccardo Pavoni, ‘Environmental Rights, Sustainable Development, and Investor-State Case Law: A 
Critical Appraisal’, Dupuy and others (n 146) 525, 531.  
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 Chemtura v Canada (n 77).  
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that ‘[…] the scientific basis for the outcome of the Special Review was insufficient.’181 
Canada appealed to its international undertakings under the Aarhus Protocol in order to 
argue the legitimacy and legality of the measures, an argument that was accepted by the 
Tribunal partially on the basis of the ambiguous position taken by the Claimant with 
respect of the safety of the product, and partially because, ‘[…] the Tribunal cannot 
ignore the fact that lindane has raised increasingly searious concerns both in other 
countries and at the international level since the 1970s […]’.182 Following the factual 
analysis, the Tribunal confidently concluded that the evidence showed that Canada 
acted in good faith and in pursuance of its international obligations, where those 
obligations themselves were used in order to establish the absence of bad faith as part of 
the evidentiary discovery. 
 
4.1.4 The DR-CAFTA 
 
The DR-CAFTA is the second major FTA signed in the American continent and the 
first between the United States and several other smaller States. The Agreement 
contains a general savings clause in Article 1.3: Relation to Other Agreements: 
 
The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under 
the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which such Parties are party. 
For greater certainty, nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the Central American 
Parties from maintaining their existing legal instruments of Central American 
integration, adopting new legal instruments of integration, or adopting measures to 
strengthen and deepen these instruments, provided that such instruments and measures 
are not inconsistent with this Agreement. 
 
The conflict clause in Paragraph 2 is not as strongly worded as the corresponding clause 
in the NAFTA, and is of more limited scope, dealing only with Central American 
Integration Agreements. The clause contained in the first paragraph has been adopted in 
many recent FTAs, normally in the following form: ‘The Parties affirm their existing 
rights and obligations with respect to each other under the WTO Agreement and other 
agreements to which both Parties are party.’183  
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 ibid, para 127. 
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 ibid, para 135 (follows list of Sates practice restricting or banning the use of lindane). 
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 Article 1.3 of the United States-Chile FTA; Article 1.2 of the United States-Colombia FTA; Article 1.2 
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Chapter Ten of the CAFTA is the investment chapter and at Article 10.2: Relation to 
Other Chapters, regulates the relationship between the investment chapter and the other 
chapters of the CAFTA: 
 
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and another Chapter, the other 
Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. 
2. A requirement by a Party that a service supplier of another Party post a bond or other 
form of financial security as a condition of the cross-border supply of a service does not 
of itself make this Chapter applicable to measures adopted or maintained by the Party 
relating to such cross-border supply of the service. This Chapter applies to measures 
adopted or maintained by the Party relating to the posted bond or financial security, to 
the extent that such bond or financial security is a covered investment. 
3. This Chapter does not apply to measures adopted or maintained by a Party to the 
extent that they are covered by Chapter Twelve (Financial Services). 
 
The article is obviously modelled on the NAFTA, but this time the scope of the article is 
wider, whereby the conflict is between chapters generally, rather than provision by 
provision as it was in the NAFTA. Finally, Article 17.12 [Relationship to 
Environmental Agreements] contained in the Environment Chapter is similar to Article 
104 of the NAFTA, in that it deals with specific conflicts with environmental 
agreements; however the article is not a conflict clause proper, establishing a clear 
hierarchy of rules, relying instead on the soft law language of cooperation and 
consultation, in keeping with the mutual supportiveness model. The article provides: 
 
1. The Parties recognize that multilateral environmental agreements to which they are 
all party play an important role in protecting the environment globally and domestically 
and that their respective implementation of these agreements is critical to achieving the 
environmental objectives of these agreements. The Parties further recognize that this 
Chapter and the ECA can contribute to realizing the goals of those agreements. 
                                                                                                                                               
of the United States-Australia FTA; Article 1.2.1 of the United States-Bahrain FTA; Article 1.2.1 of 
the United States-Korea FTA; Article 1.2.1 of the United States-Morocco FTA (with slightly 
different language, to accommodate the relationship between the FTA and the BIT); Article 1.2.1 of 
the United States-Oman FTA; Article 1.3.1 of the United States-Panama TPA; Article 1.2 of the 
United States-Peru TPA; Article 1.1.2 of the United States- Singapore FTA; Article 1.3 of the 2001 
Canada/Costa Rica FTA; Article 4 of the 2002 EFTA/Singapore FTA; Article 1.5 of the 2005 
EFTA/Korea FTA; Article 108 of the Japan/Mexico FTA (relationship with the GATS and the 
OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements); Article 11 of the 2006 Japan/Philippines 
EPA; Article 1.2 of the 2008 Australia/Chile FTA.  
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Accordingly, the Parties shall continue to seek means to enhance the mutual 
supportiveness of multilateral environmental agreements to which they are all party and 
trade agreements to which they are all party. 
2. The Parties may consult, as appropriate, with respect to ongoing negotiations in the 
WTO regarding multilateral environmental agreements. 
 
Article 104 of the NAFTA is also the model for Article 1-06 (Relation to Environmental 
and Conservation Agreements) of the 1998 Chile-Mexico FTA, for Article 1.04 
(Relation with Other International Agreements) of the 2002 FTA between the 
Governments of Central America and Chile and for Article 1.03 (Relation with Other 
International Agreements) of the 2007 Taiwan, El Salvador and Honduras FTA, as 
further proof of the normative pull exercised by the NAFTA in treaty practice in the 
Americas and beyond.
184
 
 
4.1.5 The Energy Charter Treaty 
 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) provides, as stated on the website of the Charter, ‘a 
multilateral framework for energy cooperation that is unique under international law. It 
is designed to promote energy security through the operation of more open and 
competitive energy markets, while respecting the principles of sustainable development 
and sovereignty over energy resources.’185 The ECT contains a complex system of 
conflict rules regulating both intra-treaty and extra-treaty conflicts, with particular 
reference to its relationship with the GATT and the WTO Agreements. The first of these 
rules is contained in Article 4 (Non-derogation from GATT and Related Instruments]: 
‘Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate, as between particular Contracting Parties which 
are parties to the GATT, from the provisions of the GATT and Related Instruments as 
they are applied between those Contracting Parties.’ Article 5 deals with trade-related 
investment measures and their consistency with GATT obligations: 
 
(1) A Contracting Party shall not apply any trade-related investment measure that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of article III or XI of the GATT; this shall be without 
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 Other instruments containing the clause include the 2001 Canada-Costa Rica FTA (Article 1.4) 
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 Energy Charter Homepage, at < http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=28> accessed 17 December 
2015.  
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prejudice to the Contracting Party’s rights and obligations under the GATT and Related 
Instruments and Article 29.  
(2) Such measures include any investment measure which is mandatory or enforceable 
under domestic law or under any administrative ruling, or compliance with which is 
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which requires [follows list of performance 
requirements].  
 
The article contains both a pure conflict clause and a performance requirement 
prohibition based on the implementation of domestic measures inconsistent with the 
ECT’s obligations. Both Articles 4 and 5 subject the ECT’s obligations to the parties’ 
obligations under the GATT, contrary to the equivalent NAFTA provisions considered 
above.
186
 Article 16 [Relation to Other Agreements] of Part III [Investments] provides: 
 
 Where two or more Contracting Parties have entered into a prior international 
agreement, or enter into a subsequent international agreement, whose terms in either 
case concern the subject matter of Part III or V [Dispute Settlement] of this Treaty,  
 (1) nothing in Part III or V of this Treaty shall be construed to derogate from any 
provision of such terms of the other agreement or from any right to dispute resolution 
with respect thereto under that agreement; and 
(2) nothing in such terms of the other agreement shall be construed to derogate from 
any provision of Part III or V of this Treaty or from any right to dispute resolution with 
respect thereto under this Treaty, where any such provision is more favourable to the 
Investor or Investment. 
 
The article establishes that in case of overlap with other investment agreements, the 
more favourable one shall apply, and it is therefore not applicable to international 
agreements not sharing the same subject matter.
187
 The Energy Charter Treaty is also 
accompanied by a side environmental agreement, the Energy Charter Protocol on 
Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA); its Article 13(1) 
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 Additionally, Article 29 (Interim Provisions on Trade-related Matters) makes the substantive GATT 
rules related to the energy trade applicable between the ECT Parties, regardless of their ratification 
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12). On 24 April 1998, the ‘Trade Amendment’ adopted by the International Conference of the 
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 See also AES Summit Generation Limited v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case ARB/07/22, Expert 
Opinion of Professor Piet Eeckhout, 30 October 2008. The Defendant had argued that in case of 
conflict with between EU law and the ECT, EU law should prevail. The Tribunal concluded that 
there was no conflict and therefore Article 16 ECT was not applicable. See AES v Hungary, Award 
(23 September 2010) para 7.6.8. 
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(Relation to the Energy Charter Treaty) establishes the relationship between the two 
instruments whereby: ‘In the event of inconsistency between the provisions of this 
Protocol and the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, the provisions of the Energy 
Charter Treaty shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, prevail.’  
 
The European experience of economic and political integration of Eastern Europe post-
1989 is also evidenced by the 1997 Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation 
between the European Communities and the Russian Federation.
188
 The main thrust of 
the Agreement is the inclusion of the former Soviet Union into the legal framework 
expressing the liberal consensus on market economy, rule of law and human rights, 
inclusive of environmental rights. As a programmatic instrument, the Agreement 
contains many references to other international legal instruments, both in the Preamble 
(including the ECT, the GATT and the WTO Agreements) and in dedicated Articles 
throughout the text. An important objective of the Agreement is the harmonisation 
(referred to as approximation in the text) of legislation between the Parties:
189
 this sort 
of ‘vertical harmonisation,’ which in reality is an exercise involving only Russia, does 
not necessarily deal with issues of ‘horizontal conflicts’ across legal regimes; Article 69 
of the Agreement (Environment) tackles the issue of cooperation on environmental 
protection, and singles out the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, 
inviting its implementation by the Parties. Article 58 (Investment Promotion and 
Protection) on the other hand, aims at the conclusion of BITs between the Member 
States and Russia, returning to the bilateralism typical of the investment regime. There 
is no other attempt at co-ordination between the potentially conflicting fields of 
intervention, but the entire Agreement is inspired by this integrative thrust and 
approximation effort.  
 
4.2 ‘Mutual Supportiveness’ and Soft Clauses 
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 Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, OJ 
L327, 28/11/1997, p 3.  
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 See Article 55: ‘1. The Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening the economic 
links between Russia and the Community is the approximation of legislation. Russia shall endeavour 
to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 2. The 
approximation of laws shall extend to the following areas in particular: company law, banking law, 
company accounts and taxes, protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on 
competition, public procurement, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, the 
environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, customs law, technical rules and standards, 
nuclear laws and regulations, transport.’ 
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‘Mutual supportiveness clauses’ are quite common in the third and fourth periods’ 
FTAs and PTAs. These clauses obviously share more of the ‘soft law’ nature than their 
stricter relations, the pure conflict clauses. Further down on the scale of bindingness are 
the clauses that encourage the integration not of international environmental binding 
obligations, but of soft-law, corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards and 
recommendations. For example, the 2013 Canada-Benin BIT provides at Article 16 
(Corporate Social Responsibility):  
 
Each Contracting Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or 
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards 
of corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as 
statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Contracting 
Parties. These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, 
community relations and anti-corruption. 
 
The article reflects the thrust towards the incorporation of investors’ duties in the IIAs, 
but equally, strives to link the investment obligations of the State with the CSR 
obligations of the investors, themselves based on international, rather than domestic, 
standards. However, given the non-binding character of the standards, these clauses 
replace the hierarchical structure of the international/domestic relationship with the 
similarly hierarchical hard law/soft law distinction between investment and CSR 
obligations, while placing them both on the international plane. Along the lines of the 
mutual supportiveness clauses is Article 4 of the 1999 United States-Turkey FTA, part 
of an early group of FTAs signed by the United States with several African and Asian 
countries. The Article provides: 
 
For the purpose of further developing bilateral trade and providing for a steady increase 
in the exchange of products and services, the Parties shall consider whether further 
agreements relating to trade, taxation, intellectual property, investment, labor and 
environmental issues and to any other matters agreed upon by the Parties would be 
desirable. 
 
The article does not serve as a conflict clause of either kind, as it refers to yet-to-be 
drafted instruments, but it underpins and prefigures a mutual supportiveness approach to 
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the international agreements mentioned. Of a similar nature is the more recent Article 
44 in the 2008 ‘Stepping Stone’ EPA between the EU and the Côte d’Ivoire: 
 
On the basis of the Cotonou Agreement, the Parties shall take all necessary measures 
and cooperate in order to encourage the negotiation and earliest possible conclusion of a 
global EPA in accordance with the relevant WTO provisions between the EC Party and 
West Africa as a whole, in the following areas: 
(b) investments; 
(g) sustainable development; 
The Parties shall adopt all appropriate measures with a view to encouraging the 
conclusion of a global EPA between the EC Party and West Africa before the end of 
2008.
190
 
 
The article is interesting in that it endeavours to establish a linkage between the 
Cotonou Agreement, the WTO Agreement and the EPA to be negotiated in the areas of 
investment and sustainable development, exemplifying once again the integrative thrust 
of this kind of provisions.
191
 This Agreement also contains a complex set of rules on the 
negotiation of other FTAs providing more favourable treatment, including a conflict 
rule on the application of technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (Article 36 of Chapter 4 (Multilateral Obligations)) which is applicable to the 
trade in goods provisions. Similar provisions are contained in the 2009 Interim 
Agreement signed in preparation for a comprehensive EPA between the EU and Central 
African States, including a specific article on sustainable development that establishes, 
amongst its objectives the negotiations of specific international agreements. The Article 
provides: 
 
1. The Parties recognise that sustainable development is an overall objective of the 
EPA. They therefore agree to ensure that sustainability considerations are reflected in 
all titles of the EPA and to draft specific chapters covering environmental and social 
issues. 
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 Negotiations for this EPA concluded in February 2014; full text of the agreement available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/west-africa/, accessed 17 
December 2015.  
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Preamble. 
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2. To achieve this objective, the Parties shall conclude negotiations by 1 January 2009 
on a set of potential commitments on sustainable development, which shall include in 
particular the following: 
(a) level of protection and right to regulate;  
(b) regional integration in Central Africa, use of international environmental standards 
and of the International Labour Organisation and promotion of decent work; 
(c) upholding levels of protection; 
(d) consultation and monitoring procedures. 
3. In conducting the negotiations, the EC Party shall take into account the development 
needs of the signatory Central African States, which may take the form of provisions on 
cooperation in this field.
192
 
 
Finally, recent instruments also see the incorporation of clauses designed to encourage 
the resolution of potential normative conflicts by way of diplomatic means. For 
example, Article 1906 (Consultations on Inconsistencies with Other Agreements) of the 
2004 Thailand-Australia FTA provides: 
 
If either Party considers there is any inconsistency between this Agreement and any 
other agreement to which both Parties are parties, the Parties shall consult each other 
with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution.
193
 
 
4.3 Conclusive Remarks 
 
The incorporation of conflict clauses in IIAs follows some general trends:  
 
1) The clauses are more likely to be incorporated in FTAs than in BITs;  
2) Conflicts between pure FTAs and the WTO Agreements are more extensively 
covered than conflicts between BITs/FTAs and the WTO Agreements;  
3) Intra-treaty trade/investment conflicts are more likely to be solved by way of express 
conflict provisions, while inter-treaty investment/environment conflicts are often dealt 
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 The Agreement is not in force yet; text available at 
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with by way of mutual supportiveness clauses, with or without a linkage to domestic 
legislative powers;
194
  
4) Newer instruments reflect the already recognised trend towards greater 
diversification and sophistication of clauses.  
 
Additionally, as recent FTAs contain their own side environmental agreements, this 
engenders the need to establish conflict rules between them and the ‘mother’ agreement. 
This limiting trend, whereby one of the two agreements is subordinated to the other 
(often by means of the ‘least restrictive’ clause) is accompanied by a more progressive 
comprehensive trend, whereby the environmental side agreements reaffirm the parties’ 
commitments under other environmental multilateral agreements, either in the Preamble 
or in specific clauses.  This trend, exemplified for example by the Revised 2012 US 
Model BIT, sidesteps the legal issue of normative conflict resolution, even if it adds the 
international dimension to the environmental commitments. This is evident from the 
most recent version of the US Model, where the reference to ‘domestic environmental 
laws’ in the 2004 Model is replaced with the following clause: ‘The Parties recognize 
that their respective environmental laws and policies, and multilateral environmental 
agreements to which they are both party, play an important role in protecting the 
environment’.195  
 
In its Conclusions on the Fragmentation of International Law, the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission gave the following guidelines on the adoption of 
specific conflict clauses: 
 
When States enter into a treaty that might conflict with other treaties, they should aim to 
settle the relationship between such treaties by adopting appropriate conflict clauses. 
When adopting such clauses, it should be borne in mind that:  
(a) They may not affect the rights of third parties;  
(b) They should be as clear and specific as possible. In particular, they should be 
directed to specific provisions of the treaty and they should not undermine the object 
and purpose of the treaty;  
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 See for example Article 5(3) of the Belgium Model BIT: ‘The Contracting Parties reaffirm their 
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shall strive to ensure that such commitments are fully recognised and implemented by their domestic 
legislation;’ Article 18.8 of the United States-Singapore FTA.  
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(c) They should, as appropriate, be linked with means of dispute settlement.
196
 
 
I have considered already the difficulties intrinsic to the resolution of normative 
conflicts, with or without the inclusions of specific conflict clauses, and when these are 
applicable, with or without the above criteria suggested by the ILC. A few conclusive 
remarks are apposite. The first is a reminder of the coordination challenges between the 
law of treaties and the law of international responsibility of States. A commonly 
accepted outcome of this challenge is the resort to the ‘political decision solution’ by 
States facing the choice between conflicting obligations, since their international 
responsibility for the breach of an obligation is potentially unaffected by the application 
of the law of treaties. A less immediately obvious consequence is that the ‘all or 
nothing’ approach of Article 30 VCLT inevitably will present the States with the stark 
choice of respecting one obligation at the risk of incurring the full responsibility for the 
breach of the conflicting obligation. It is at this juncture that the enforcement divide 
between investment law and environmental law can exert its maximum influence, 
whereby political expedience will be flanked by economic calculus in dictating the 
choice of compliance: there is at present no enforcement mechanism in environmental 
law guaranteeing the level of compensation commonly available for breaches of 
investment obligations, and it is understandable that short-term economic calculations 
might convince States to breach their international environmental obligations in order to 
honour their investment undertakings. Express conflict clauses can only partially 
remedy this problem, unless they are drafted quite carefully and comply with all the 
criteria listed by the ILC.  
 
Mutual supportiveness clauses do away with the problem of the ‘all or nothing’ 
approach of Article 30 VCLT but replace it with the interpretative conundrums already 
noted, and do not guarantee any certainty of outcome. In fact, they are not relied upon 
by States in any significant manner, and they mostly leave the enforcement divide 
unaffected.  
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5. Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation I have considered some of the legal tools available to tribunals to 
avoid or harmonise conflicts, maintaining the ‘unity of international law,’ when 
applying IIAs both containing and lacking specific provisions to deal with those 
conflicts. Less attention has been devoted, for reasons of space, to the consequences of 
normative conflicts.
197
 In this regard, is important to not use a tunnel vision and 
disregard the economic and political framework, as well as the legal one. In particular, 
the very occurrence of a conflict is ultimately the result of choices made by the State: 
internationally, to enter into agreements that might have as a consequence of their 
implementation (or even of their ratification) the occurrence of a normative conflicts 
with other agreements covering other substantive areas of law. Domestically, to 
transpose into domestic law these international obligations, or to implement certain 
measures that might be challenged by investors on the basis of an IIA.  
 
To this effect, and taking as the discriminating factor the behaviour of the State (its 
choices), the following scheme might be proposed: 
 
Choices Legal consequences Economic consequences 
For States For investors For States For investors 
No regulation Possible breach 
of international 
treaty 
Liable to tort 
action if complicit 
in violation of 
international law 
Mitigation costs for 
environmental or 
other damages 
Higher profits, but 
risk of damage 
payments if tort 
action successful 
Regulation + 
compensation 
No 
consequences 
No consequences Payment of 
compensation can 
be beyond means 
of host State 
Lower profits, but 
compensated 
Regulation/no 
compensation 
Possible 
arbitration 
Recourse to 
arbitration 
Arbitration costs + 
damages if claim 
successful 
Lower profits, but 
possibility of 
damage payments 
if claim successful 
  
As with the other table offered in Chapter Two, the table puts into focus the work that 
remains to be done in the field of normative conflicts, especially for what concerns the 
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of customary law. 
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measures taken by States both in view of a political and diplomatic solution, and also 
for a more specifically legal approach. 
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